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The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation 
THE  CONCEPT  of a natural unemployment  rate has been central to most 
modern  models  of  inflation  and  stabilization.  According  to  these 
models,  inflation  will  accelerate  or decelerate  depending  on  whether 
unemployment  is below  or above  the natural rate, while  any existing 
rate of  inflation  will  continue  if  unemployment  is  at the natural rate. 
The  natural rate is  thus the  minimum,  and only,  sustainable  rate of 
unemployment,  but the  inflation  rate is  left  as  a choice  variable  for 
policymakers.  Since  complete  price  stability  has  attractive  features, 
many economists  and policymakers  who accept the natural rate hypoth- 
esis  believe  that central banks should target zero inflation. 
We question the standard version of the natural rate model and each 
of these implications.  Central to our analysis is the effect  of downward 
nominal wage  rigidity  in an economy  in which individual firms expe- 
rience  stochastic  shocks  in  the  demand for  their output.  We  embed 
these  features in a model  that otherwise  resembles  a standard natural 
rate model  and show  there is  no unique  natural unemployment  rate. 
Rather, the rate of unemployment that is consistent with steady inflation 
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itself  depends on the inflation rate. In the long run, a moderate steady 
rate of  inflation  permits  maximum  employment  and output.  Mainte- 
nance of zero inflation measurably increases the sustainable unemploy- 
ment rate and correspondingly  reduces  the level  of  output. We  show 
that these effects  are large, not negligible  as some previous studies have 
claimed. 
The view  that unemployment  will settle at a fixed natural rate if any 
steady rate of inflation is maintained is presumably the rationale for the 
Economic Growth and Price Stability Act of 1995, proposed by Senator 
Connie  Mack.  According  to the preamble of this bill,  "because  price 
stability leads to the lowest possible  interest rates and is a key condition 
to maintaining the highest possible  levels  of productivity, real incomes, 
living  standards, employment,  and global  competitiveness,  price sta- 
bility  should be the primary long-term goal of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve  System."'  But as our results show,  a target of 
zero inflation will  impose  permanent real costs  on the economy  rather 
than the real benefits this preamble describes. 
Although  the  appealing  simplicity  of  the  assumptions  underlying 
natural rate models  has  put them in the forefront of  macroeconomic 
modeling,  there is ample precedent for our attention to downward wage 
rigidity and efficient  employment  levels,  not only among labor econo- 
mists  but  also  in  earlier  macroeconomic  models  of  inflation.  James 
Tobin stressed their importance in his  1971 presidential address to the 
American Economic  Association,  in which he presented a model based 
on nominal rigidity that "implies  a long-run Phillips curve that is very 
flat for high unemployment  and becomes  vertical at a critically low rate 
of unemployment."  Indeed,  in the first Phillips curve paper written in 
the United  States,  Paul  Samuelson  and Robert Solow  had noted that 
"downward  inflexibility  keeps  prices  from falling.  .  .  . The result is 
an upward drift in average prices-with  the suggestion  that monetary 
and fiscal  policies  restricti-ve enough  to prevent an average price rise 
would have to be so very restrictive as to produce a considerable  level 
of unemployment  and a significant drop in production."  They,  in turn, 
were reflecting on the "demand shift"  theory of Charles Schultze,  who 
1. Quoted in U.S.  Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Statement  by Connie 
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stressed  that  "creeping  inflation  is  associated  with  the  dynamics  of 
resource allocation.'  '2 
The  plan  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  We  start with  a  review  of 
ethnographic evidence  that points to reasons why rational firms would 
want  to  avoid  cutting  nominal  wages,  and then  provide  a range  of 
evidence  establishing  empirically  that nominal wage cuts are rare, ex- 
cept when firms are under extreme  financial strain. This evidence  in- 
cludes comprehensive  data on U.S.  manufacturing establishments,  data 
on both Canadian and U.S.  union wage settlements,  employers'  reports 
from special  studies,  and our own  telephone  survey of  individuals  in 
the Washington,  D.C.,  area. We also examine recent studies based on 
panel data that measure wage changes as the first difference in reported 
wage  levels  from consecutive  survey  years.  These  estimates  of  wage 
changes  suggest  that wage  cuts are frequent,  seemingly  contradicting 
the findings  from other sources.  However,  we show  that the apparent 
frequency of wage  cuts in the panel data is spurious, because  many of 
the apparent wage cuts arise from errors in reported wage  levels. 
Having established  the empirical importance of downward wage ri- 
gidity,  we present a formal model that reflects optimizing  behavior of 
firms that explicitly  allows  for downward wage  rigidity  under all but 
extreme circumstances and takes account of heterogeneous wage setting 
by firms. Relative  to previous  attempts to assess  the consequences  of 
downward wage rigidity,  our innovations multiply the calculated losses 
in employment  and output from low  inflation policies  in three ways. 
First,  our interpretations of  the evidence  on wage  rigidity  lead us to 
model  nominal  wage  cuts  as much less  likely  than do other authors. 
Second,  we  show  that the effects  of  constraints  are cumulative  in  a 
heterogeneous  dynamic model, where firms that raise wages in response 
to favorable shocks  in one period are more likely  to be constrained by 
downward rigidity in subsequent periods. And third, we provide a gen- 
eral-equilibrium  solution  in which  the impact on wages  of  downward 
wage constraints acts like a real cost shock, which the constrained firms 
pass on,  in terms of higher prices. 
General-equilibrium  and partial-equilibrium analyses  produce very 
2.  Tobin (1972,  p.  11); Samuelson and Solow (1960,  p.  182); Schultze (1959, 
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different estimates of the consequences  of targeting zero inflation. Both 
analyses  begin  with an estimate  of the shift in the aggregate supply of 
labor because  of  nominal  wage  rigidity.  Partial-equilibrium  analysis 
then multiplies the shift between the real wage with and without nominal 
wage rigidity by the elasticity  of demand for labor to obtain the impact 
of downward wage rigidity on the level of employment.  Typically,  this 
elasticity  of demand is assumed to be fairly low-less  than one. 
General-equilibrium  analysis follows  the impact of downward wage 
rigidity beyond the labor demand of the individual firms with downward 
wage  constraints.  The  special  case  of  constant product elasticities  of 
demand is not essential  to the argument, but makes it easy to highlight 
the  difference  between  general-equilibrium  and partial-equilibrium 
analysis.  Firms whose  nominal wages  are raised by constraints pass on 
their increased costs  in higher prices.  The markup is constant, because 
of constant elasticity  of demand,  and so the average real wage will be 
unchanged by the impact of  wage  constraints.  The real average wage 
has two components.  The first component is the unconstrained real wage 
that results  from  labor  supply  and demand  or  bargaining,  and is  a 
function of the unemployment  rate. The other component of real wages 
is  due  to  downward  wage  rigidity.  When  this  component  increases, 
unemployment  must  increase  by  enough  to  lower  the  unconstrained 
component equally,  to keep average real wages constant.  The increase 
in  the  component  due  to  downward  rigidity  can  be  thought  of  as  a 
permanent cost  shock.  Typically,  it takes a 2 percent increase  in un- 
employment to offset such a 1 percent cost shock. Our analysis produces 
such a multiplier. 
We develop a stochastic simulation based on our general-equilibrium 
model.  This  simulation  is  calibrated to conform  to data on the U.S. 
economy.  We  use  it to  examine  the performance  of  the economy  at 
alternative steady rates of inflation.  We calibrate the model to have an 
unemployment  rate of  5.8  percent at 3 percent inflation because  this 
seems to be the typical estimate of the present natural rate. But perfor- 
mance changes nonlinearly as the steady inflation rate approaches zero, 
and at zero inflation  the sustainable  unemployment  rate is noticeably 
higher.  In  a  large  number of  simulations  using  different  parameter 
values,  the change  in the sustainable unemployment  rate is rarely less 
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We also develop  a version of the model that is suitable to estimation 
with time-series  data. It embeds the features of the simulation model in 
an otherwise  conventional  natural rate model of inflation,  allowing  for 
parameters to be estimated  from time-series  data. When the model  is 
fit to postwar data, the estimated parameters are reasonably consistent 
with the counterpart concepts  in the simulation  model,  and the calcu- 
lated values of sustainable unemployment rates vary with inflation rates 
in much the  same  way  as they  do in the simulation  model.  We  then 
show that a dynamic simulation of the model fit to postwar data closely 
tracks price changes  during the Great Depression,  a period that noto- 
riously defies explanation  with conventional  natural rate models. 
Evidence  on Downward  Rigidity 
Our own reading of  the evidence,  and the fundamental assumption 
of the model that we develop  below,  is that nominal wages  are down- 
ward rigid,  except  when firms are under extreme duress.  Twenty-five 
years ago,  that hypothesis  would have been widely  accepted and could 
have been employed  in a macroeconomic  model  without specific  em- 
pirical  support.  Since  then,  it has  come  to  be  ignored  in theoretical 
macroeconomic  models,  and its empirical importance has recently been 
questioned by some authors on the basis of panel data on wage changes. 
We present a range of evidence  demonstrating that downward rigidity 
is an important feature of wage behavior,  and then show that contrary 
results  from  panel  data are spurious,  because  they  arise from errors 
made by respondents in reporting their wage levels.  But first we discuss 
various studies that suggest why downward wage rigidity is likely to be 
a feature of wage  setting. 
Ethnographic  Evidence 
Ethnographic observation by Truman Bewley  and William Brainard 
provides  direct  evidence  on  the  attitudes of  employers  toward wage 
cuts.3 In  1992,  Bewley  and Brainard interviewed  businesspeople  and 
others professionally  involved  in  the job  market in  Connecticut,  in- 
3.  Bewley  and Brainard (1993);  Bewley  (1994). 6  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
quiring specifically  about the reluctance to cut wages  and the reasons 
behind the wage cuts that do occur. They discovered that pay cuts were 
only an infrequent response to declines in sales,  and that managers were 
much more fearful of the effects  on morale caused by a cut in pay than 
by  a wage  freeze,  which  leaves  real  wages  declining  by  the rate of 
inflation.  The  previous  two  years  had been  difficult  for  firms in the 
region,  and the authors did find instances of wage cuts. In their sample 
of sixty-one  firms, five had initiated cuts for some or all of their workers 
in the recent past, while the managers of six more firms could remember 
cuts during the last ten years.  An additional eleven  firms had initiated 
wage  freezes.  Of the eleven  firms that reported cutting wages  at some 
time in their history,  most,  but not quite all,  had done so in response 
to  serious  problems.  And  in two  cases,  the cuts  had been  rescinded 
within six months. 
Looking  at the circumstances  surrounding the pay cuts, Bewley  and 
Brainard describe one firm that cut wages as having had losses  for three 
years,  another as doing  so in  1991 in response to losses  that began in 
1989,  another in response  to  "cash  flow problems,"  another because 
its sales suddenly  "fell  off a cliff,"  and yet another because it was "in 
danger of going out of business."  These firms instigated nominal wage 
cuts, and workers accepted them, only when the firms faced the prospect 
of  bankruptcy.  In two  other instances,  wages  were  cut because  they 
were perceived  as having gotten permanently out of line. One store had 
allowed  its sales  force to build up the base rate of pay as an incentive 
to achieve  high volume,  with the result that incentive pay for sales had 
become  too low.  It used the recession  as an opportunity to reestablish 
the balance between commissions  and base pay. The other readjustment 
of  long-term  wages  occurred  when  a raider took  over  a plant in  the 
South.  The previous  owner had maintained parity between  this plant, 
which was not unionized,  and its other, unionized establishments.  The 
new  owner took  advantage of  the disparity between  union wages  and 
competitive  wages  to make a 15 percent wage cut at the time of take- 
over.  Overall,  Bewley  and Brainard paint a picture in which firms cut 
wages  only reluctantly. 
The attitudes of employers  that Bewley  and Brainard report support 
the  well-known  study  of  popular  conceptions  of  fairness  by  Daniel 
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people  feel that nominal pay cuts are unfair, except in unusual circum- 
stances  such as the near-bankruptcy of their employers.  Respondents 
were asked whether they viewed  a number of different actions  as fair 
or unfair.  Sixty-two  percent considered  that it would  be unfair for a 
company making a small profit to decrease wages by 7 percent if infla- 
tion were zero. In contrast, if inflation were 12 percent, only 22 percent 
of respondents thought that a raise of only 5 percent would be unfair.4 
Eldar Shafir, Peter Diamond,  and Amos Tversky produce similar find- 
ings in their study of money illusion.5  Their questions show that inter- 
viewees  do not like wage cuts; they prefer situations in which nominal 
wages  rise,  even  though the real consequences  are the same. 
A recent study by Carl Campbell and Kunul Kamlani examines  the 
reasons why firms are reluctant to reduce wages  in recessions.6  Com- 
pensation  professionals  at larger firms and wage  setters from smaller 
firms were asked to evaluate the importance of different reasons for the 
reluctance to make wage cuts in recessions.  They gave the most weight 
to the potential loss of the most productive workers (who,  presumably, 
were receiving  lower wages  relative to productivity than their cowork- 
ers)  and the effect  on the motivation  of  workers who  received  wage 
cuts.  Confirming  the  earlier  findings  of  Kahneman,  Knetsch,  and 
Thaler, the respondents thought that workers whose  wages  were cut at 
firms with losses  would  decrease  their efforts by less  than their coun- 
terparts at firms earning profits.  Those  who  might expect  that norms 
against nominal wage cuts only apply to blue collar workers would be 
surprised to  learn that these  compensation  professionals  thought that 
the effect  on productivity  would,  in fact, be more significant for white 
collar workers. 
Bewley  and Brainard directly document the importance attached to 
avoiding  nominal  wage  cuts,  except  as an extreme  measure,  when  a 
firm is in serious trouble.  Kahneman, Knetsch,  and Thaler and Camp- 
bell and Kamlani provide reasons why rational employers would behave 
in this way.  We now turn to quantitative evidence  on the importance of 
downward rigidity in nominal wages. 
4.  Kahneman,  Knetsch, and Thaler  (1986, p. 731, questions  4A and 4B). 
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Table 1. General  Wage Changes  in Manufacturing,  1959-78 
Percent, production and related workers 
Union  Nonunion 
Year  Increase  No change  Decrease  Increase  No change  Decrease 
1959  87.0  12.9  0.0  68.6  31.4  0.0 
1960  87.1  12.8  0.1  59.0  41.0  0.0 
1961  83.3  16.6  0.1  54.0  45.6  0.4 
1962  72.8  27.1  0.1  52.9  47.1  0.0 
1963  77.8  22.0  0.2  69.6  30.2  0.2 
1964  76.1  23.9  0.1  56.2  43.8  0.0 
1965  87.3  12.7  0.0  75.4  24.6  0.0 
1966  80.9  19.1  0.0  77.8  22.2  0.0 
1967  90.6  9.4  0.0  81.1  18.9  0.0 
1968  93.7  6.3  0.0  87.6  12.4  0.0 
1969  93.2  6.8  0.0  75.5  24.5  0.0 
1970  94.8  5.2  0.0  77.6  22.4  0.0 
1971  92.0  8.0  0.0  70.2  29.4  0.4 
1972  92.9  7.1  0.0  83.2  16.8  0.1 
1973  95.9  4.1  0.0  90.1  9.9  0.0 
1974  97.8  2.2  0.0  89.1  10.7  0.3 
1975  97.3  2.7  0.0  84.7  15.3  0.0 
1976  96.9  3.1  0.0  88.4  11.6  0.0 
1977  96.1  3.9  0.0  84.8  15.2  0.0 
1978  96.6  3.4  0.0  89.3  10.7  0.0 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics,  "Current Wage Developments,"  various issues. 
Wage Changes  in Manufacturing 
From 1959 to  1978,  the Bureau of Labor Statistics  (BLS)  collected 
data on the distribution of general wage changes  in manufacturing es- 
tablishments.  These data are confined to production and related workers 
in establishments  that make general wage changes,  but in other respects 
are quite broad, covering establishments of all sizes and wages for both 
unionized  and nonunionized  workers. The results, summarized in table 
1, show that in any given  year a considerable fraction of firms gave no 
general nominal wage  increase in the low-inflation  period of the early 
1960s,  and  among  nonunion  establishments,  many  gave  no  general 
increase even  during the inflationary 1970s.  But in no year did a non- 
trivial fraction of these  manufacturing establishments  cut wages.  The 
data show  a pronounced  asymmetry; the part of the tail of  the distri- 
bution  of  wage  changes  below  zero  is  almost  completely  truncated. 
These  data are not available  for the early  1980s,  a period when wage 
concessions  were reported in some conspicuously  troubled industries. George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  9 
Union Settlements 
BLS  data for  1970  through  1994  on union  settlements  for private 
workers that involved  more than one thousand workers provide another 
look  at the frequency  of  wage  cuts,  and also  at the unusual develop- 
ments of the early  1980s.  In this period,  wage cuts were common only 
in 1983,  when 15 percent of all settlements had negative changes in the 
first year. Even in this year there was considerable  evidence  of down- 
ward rigidity,  in that 22 percent of all contracts had no wage  change. 
In the preceding  year,  42  percent of  new  contracts had freezes  and 2 
percent had wage cuts.  This episode  supports our view  that downward 
rigidity is broken when firms are under extreme duress.  The  1981-82 
recession  was  particularly  severe;  unemployment  peaked  at over  10 
percent,  the highest  level  since  the end of the Great Depression.  Ex- 
cluding  1983 from our sample,  an average of only  1.7 percent of work- 
ers were  involved  in negative  wage  settlements  in the first year of  a 
contract,  and this overstates  the frequency  of wage  cuts in any given 
year,  since  there  were  fewer  negative  changes  over  the  life  of  the 
contract than in the first year. Assuming  an average contract life of two 
years,  and if  all  wage  cuts  occur  in the first year,  the proportion of 
workers  with  negative  changes  in  any  one  year  would  be  only  0.9 
percent.  Most recently,  from  1990 through 1994,  only  2.2  percent of 
workers covered  by new  settlements  took wage  cuts,  despite  inflation 
in the CPI averaging only  3.6  percent. 
A further check  on the frequency  of  negative  wage  changes  under 
conditions  of  very  low  inflation  and high unemployment  comes  from 
Canadian data analyzed by Pierre Fortin.7 From 1992 to 1994,  Canada 
averaged  1.2 percent inflation (as measured by the CPI) and 11.0 per- 
cent  unemployment.  Fortin's  tabulation of  wage  settlements  in large 
collective  agreements  without COLA clauses  shows that only 5.7  per- 
cent  of  such  agreements  had cuts,  while  47.2  percent called  for un- 
changed  wages.  This  huge  mass  at zero demonstrates the undeniable 
importance of wage rigidity in Canadian contracts. In somewhat better 
times  there were  yet fewer  cuts in base pay.  From 1986 to  1988,  for 
example,  with  4.2  percent  inflation  and 8.8  percent unemployment, 
7.  Personal  communication  from Pierre  Fortin, University  of Quebec at Montreal, 
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only 0.25  percent of such contracts had wage cuts,  while  12.6  percent 
had wage  freezes. 
Historical  Evidence  on Wage Rigidity 
Although  evidence  on  wage  rigidity  before  World War II is  much 
harder to  come  by,  some  authors have  tackled  the job.  Daniel  J.  B. 
Mitchell,  in his study of changing wage flexibility,  compares the post- 
war behavior  of  manufacturing wages  discussed  above  with evidence 
on manufacturing wages  from establishment  surveys in the 1920s.  Al- 
though  he  expresses  reservations  about the reliability  of  these  early 
surveys,  he concludes  that downward wage rigidity was less character- 
istic of the 1920s,  and suggests  that it became prominent as a result of 
legal  and institutional  changes,  especially  the development  and accep- 
tance of modern labor relations practices,  which,  he argues, have their 
roots  in the Great Depression.  Anthony  O'Brien,  however,  using  in- 
formation from trade and industry sources,  establishes  the existence  of 
downward rigidity  in the  1920s.  He shows  that employers  were even 
reluctant to cut wages  during the onset of the Great Depression,  before 
the legal  and institutional  changes  cited by Mitchell  occurred,  and he 
finds that this reluctance was overcome  only after economic  conditions 
worsened in the early 1930s.  Christopher Hanes finds evidence  of nom- 
inal wage rigidity in the recession  that began in 1893,  as well  as in the 
early stages of the Great Depression.  All three authors are testing mod- 
ern theories  of why  firms would be reluctant to cut wages;  none finds 
reason to question  that firms had been reluctant to do so,  even  before 
the postwar period.8 
A Survey of Wage Changes 
In order to get direct evidence  on wage  changes  for individuals,  in 
the summer of  1995 we conducted a telephone  survey of the Washing- 
ton,  D.C.,  area. In particular, we  wanted to ask directly  about wage 
changes  in order to be  able to compare our results  with those  of  the 
Panel Study of Income  Dynamics  (PSID),  which asks about wage lev- 
els.  We judged that although many workers might not report accurately 
the amount of their base wage  or salary each year, they would be able 
8.  Mitchell (1985); O'Brien (1989); Hanes (1993, 1996). George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  11 
to recall whether their wage had changed in the last twelve months and, 
if  so,  whether  it had increased  or decreased.  When  respondents  did 
report negative  wage  changes,  we requested further information about 
the circumstances.  If individuals  are frequently moved  into lower po- 
sitions,  it might be rare to see a wage reduction for a job classification, 
even though individuals correctly report that they have taken wage cuts. 
The questionnaire was designed  to detect such a possibility. 
In the core of  the survey,  respondents  were first asked about their 
employment  status,  and, if employed,  whether they had the same em- 
ployer as one year ago.  Those who had stayed with the same employer 
were then asked if their job title or classification  had changed over the 
past year,  and whether  they  were  performing  substantially  the  same 
duties  as they had been  a year ago.  After the method of pay (for ex- 
ample,  hourly wage,  annualized salary) had been ascertained,  respon- 
dents  were  asked,  "Excluding  overtime,  commissions,  and bonuses, 
has your base rate of pay changed since a year ago today?"  Affirmative 
responses  were  followed  with  "Did  it increase  or decrease?  By  how 
much?"  Additional demographic information, including age, race, and 
sector of employment,  was then solicited. 
We contacted a total of 569 individuals.  Of the 409 respondents who 
had not changed employers and who were wage or salary earners, seven 
reported wage  or salary cuts  with  no change  in the circumstances  of 
their job.  Four of  these  were  workers  for  the  District  of  Columbia 
government,  which then and now confronts a budget crisis; one was a 
construction  worker  who  speculated  that his  employer  had  reduced 
wages  and substituted illegal  aliens for native-born workers; one was a 
railroad worker who was paid by the run and reported the rate had been 
reduced because of cutbacks; and one acted sufficiently  intoxicated that 
the interviewer doubted whether any of the questions were being under- 
stood,  before  the  respondent  abruptly hung  up.  In addition  to  these 
seven,  four other respondents reported a change in circumstances  that 
resulted in a lower individual wage or salary, but not necessarily  lower 
overall  compensation,  for the same job.  Of these,  two had been pro- 
moted from part-time to full-time  employment  over the course of the 
year; one  explained  that she  had taken a decrease  in wages  but was 
more than compensated  by an increase in benefits.  The other two said 
that they had changed jobs  within the firm. 
The survey results, summarized in table 2, show that only 2.7 percent 12  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Table  2. Job Stayers  Reporting  Changes in Base Pay in Previous  Year 
Percent,  except where  indicated 
Reported change  Number of 
Negative  None  Positive  respondents 
Total  2.7  30.8  66.5  409 
Private  2.4  34.0  63.6  250 
Public  3.  1  25.8  71.1  159 
Wage  earners  5.8  39.8  54.4  103 
Private  4.0  41.9  54.1  74 
Public  10.3  34.5  55.2  29 
Salaried  and  other  1.6  27.8  70.6  306 
Private  1.7  30.7  67.6  176 
Public  1.5  23.8  74.6  130 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1995 Washington area telephone survey, as described in text. 
of respondents who had stayed at the same job had received wage cuts. 
This result does  not depend on the large number of federal workers in 
the Washington area. In fact, only 2.4 percent of private sector workers 
reported wage cuts.  Admittedly,  the survey is not a representative sam- 
ple of the national population,  as it is confined to the Washington area 
and biased toward people who answered the telephone and were willing 
to answer our questions.  Nonetheless,  it suggests  that the fraction of 
workers who receive  wage cuts in any given year is small; with double 
the  survey  fractions,  the  numbers are still  small.  This  conclusion  is 
supported by the answers to another question  on our survey: whether 
respondents  personally  knew  anyone who had ever taken a cut in pay 
while on the same job.  The meaning of these answers depends upon the 
universe of friends, relatives,  and acquaintances of the respondents and 
on their memories.  Nevertheless,  if pay cuts were fairly common,  we 
would expect that they could easily dredge up some instances.  Yet only 
14.7  percent of respondents recalled personal knowledge  of a pay cut. 
Recent Panel  Studies 
Four recent studies,  by David Card and Dean Hyslop,  David Lebow, 
David  Stockton,  and William  Wascher,  Shulamit Kahn, and Kenneth 
McLaughlin,  have used data from the PSID to analyze wage change for 
individuals.9  In each  case,  the  authors compute  wage  change  as the 
9.  Card  and Hyslop (1996); Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher  (1995); Kahn (1995); 
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difference  between  reported wage levels  in consecutive  years.  All find 
evidence  of  asymmetry in the histograms  of wage  changes,  and some 
bunching at zero change.  But the histograms also show that in any year, 
a noticeable  fraction  of  workers receive  wage  or salary cuts.  If true, 
such a finding would greatly reduce the economic  significance of down- 
ward rigidity.  However,  we show  that the crude data cannot be inter- 
preted in this way.  Most  of these  negative  changes  are spurious; they 
arise because  errors in the reporting of wage levels  greatly exaggerate 
the  actual frequency  of  wage  cuts.  All  four studies  are aware of  the 
importance of reporting error. But, except for McLaughlin,  the authors 
make no attempt to correct for the errors that we  find important, and 
we find that McLaughlin's  correction does not go nearly far enough.'0 
Validation  studies  of  wage  surveys  similar  to the PSID  show  that 
reporting errors are quite  large.  For example,  the January 1977  vali- 
dation  study  of  the  Current Population  Survey  (CPS)  shows  an esti- 
mated standard deviation of 0. 167 in the difference between log wages 
reported by household  respondents and those reported by their employ- 
ers.  1I With such a standard deviation,  response error alone could easily 
account for all the observations  of wage cuts in the PSID. We compare 
the findings using the PSID with other evidence  to show this is, in fact, 
the case.12 
10. McLaughlin  presents corrected measures of  the standard  deviation of  wage 
changes, and  then infers  the impact  of the correction  for the frequency  of negative  wage 
changes, using the empirical  distribution  of wage changes in the PSID. However, this 
is inappropriate  if the underlying  true distribution  is asymmetric,  as the distribution  of 
wage changes appears  to be. For example, suppose that the true distribution  of wage 
changes contained  no negative values. If a normal  measurement  error  was added  to the 
true  values, a large number  of false negative  wage changes  would be recorded.  Simply 
reducing  the variance  of the empirical  distribution  by a mean-preserving  reduction  in 
the spread  equal to the variance  of the measurement  error, as McLaughlin  does, will 
reduce  the frequency  of false negatives  but will not eliminate  them. It is impossible  to 
reconstruct  the true  underlying  distribution  in this fashion. Kahn  recognizes  the presence 
of errors  but  does not attempt  to correct  for them  because  doing so would  only strengthen 
her conclusions about  the presence  of downward  rigidity. 
11. Mellow and Sider (1983, p. 335, n. 6) report  that "the estimated  variance  of 
the difference in log wage is 0.167."  Our calculations,  based on regression  estimates 
that  they present, suggest approximately  this figure  for the standard  deviation. 
12. A validation survey for the PSID shows large errors  in reported  income, but 
since the plant chosen for the survey did not pay straight  time wages, the accuracy  of 
the PSID question  on hourly  earnings  cannot  be assessed (see Duncan  and Hill, 1985). 14  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Comparing Our Survey Data  with the PSID 
Armed with our survey results,  we check  whether the PSID-gener- 
ated data could have arisen from a population that resembles our survey, 
making appropriate allowance  for reporting error in the PSID.  To this 
end,  we  "dirty"  our data by  adding random errors corresponding  to 
observed distributions of response errors in the CPS, in which questions 
about wages  are quite  similar  to  those  in the PSID.  To  estimate  the 
distribution of  the response  error in wage  changes,  we need to know 
not only  the distribution of  response  error for wage  levels  in a single 
survey,  but  also  the  autocorrelation  of  those  response  errors across 
surveys  and the frequency  with which  people  report their wages  cor- 
rectly.  The distribution of these  response  errors is generated with the 
help  of  three separate statistics.  In the  1977  CPS  validation  survey, 
workers'  wage  responses  are matched against  responses  of  their em- 
ployers  and,  as mentioned  above,  have a standard deviation  of 0.167 
in the difference  between  log  wages  reported by individuals  and log 
wages reported by their respective employers.  The CPS-social  security 
match survey shows the autocorrelation of differences between earnings 
reported by CPS respondents and their individual earnings as reported 
to  the  Social  Security  Administration.'3  These  parameters would  be 
sufficient  to generate  a normal distribution of response  error, but one 
final consideration  suggests  that the errors are not  normal: some  re- 
spondents-in  fact, 44.2  percent-report  their wages or salaries exactly 
right.  So we generate the error distribution under the assumption that 
44.2  percent of  respondents  make no error in either year and the rest 
make normally distributed autocorrelated errors. 
The alternative distributions of wage change are compared in figure 
1. The upper left  panel  shows  the histogram of  wage  changes  in our 
Washington area survey. The histogram when our wage survey is dirtied 
as just described is shown in the upper right panel. And the lower right 
panel shows  the histogram of wage  changes  calculated  from the PSID 
of  1988,  a year in which wage inflation was comparable to the average 
wage increase in our sample. The dirtied histogram shows a much fatter 
left  tail  and even  more  instances  of  negative  wage  change  than the 
PSID,  implying  that an error-free distribution of  wage  changes  from 
13. Bound and Krueger  (1991). George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  15 
Figure 1. Distribution  of Wage  Changes  for Job Stayers 
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Source: Data for the upper left panel are from the authors' survey; for the lower right panel, from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID); and for the other panels, from the authors' calculations as described in text. 
a. With correlation of correct responses in consecutive years of  1.0, and standard  deviation of response error of 0. 167. 
b. With correlation of correct responses in consecutive years of 0.5,  and standard  deviation of response error calculated 
so that standard  deviation of distribution equals standard  deviation of wage changes in the PSID. 
the PSID would show an even smaller  proportion  of wage cuts than  our 
survey. 
Our  conclusion that  most negative wage changes  in the PSID are  due 
to measurement  error  is robust  to various changes we made in gener- 
ating  the error  term. We performed  various  checks. For  example, since 
our data on wage changes probably also contain some measurement 
error, it should not be surprising  that the standard  deviation of our 
dirtied  distribution  is greater  than that of the PSID. As a conservative 
alternative  to the previous comparison, we assume a response error 16  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
small enough to make the variation  in our data  plus this response  error 
just conform  to the PSID data for 1988. This yields approximately  the 
same proportion  of negative wage changes as that reported  by Kahn. 
The lower left panel in figure 1 shows this alternative  hypothetical 
distribution. 
Comparing  Union Settlement Data  with the PSID 
John  Shea has examined  the measurement  errors  for unionized  work- 
ers in the PSID directly and reports  his results in a discussion of the 
Card  and Hyslop study.  14 Shea matches  individual  PSID households  to 
the provisions of particular  union contracts  by relating  PSID informa- 
tion on individuals' industry,  occupation,  union affiliation, and county 
of residence to information  from other sources about  employers' loca- 
tions and bargaining  outcomes. For the period from 1981-82 through 
1986-87,  this procedure  yields 379 observations  for which Shea has 
contract  data to compare  with responses from employees in the PSID. 
He calculates  that  only 1  .3 percent  of his sample  have received  nominal 
wage cuts according  to their  contracts,  while over the same  period, 21. 1 
percent  report  wage levels in consecutive years of the PSID that, when 
subtracted,  imply wage cuts. 
As a further  check on the PSID-based  results, we compare  the inci- 
dence of wage cuts calculated from the PSID data with the incidence 
of cuts in new union contracts  discussed above. Kahn  reports  that, on 
the average, 11.8 percent of changes in nominal  wages were negative 
for union workers  in the PSID for the years 1976 to 1988.15  Given that 
only 3.5 percent  of workers  in large bargaining  sessions took a pay cut 
in the first year of a new contract, this implies that a minimum  of 70 
percent of  the negative wage changes from the PSID are spurious; 
recognizing  that  wage cuts are  concentrated  in the first  year  of multiyear 
contracts  raises the proportion  to 85 percent, on the assumption  that 
any cuts occurred  in the first year of two-year contracts. If the wages 
of workers  involved in smaller settlements  behave more like those in 
the nonunionized sector, the foregoing figures would overstate wage 
cuts if nonunion workers have a lower incidence of wage cuts than 
union workers. In fact, Kahn shows that in the PSID from 1976 to 
14.  Shea (1996). 
15.  Kahn (1995,  table 2,  p.  17). George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  17 
1988, the incidence  of negative  wage changes  for nonunionized  workers 
is 20 percent lower than for unionized workers  (9.45 percent as com- 
pared  to 11.77 percent).  16 
Comparing the PSID  with Employers'  Wage Reports 
We also have evidence about  wage changes  from  employers'  records 
to compare  with the PSID data  on wages of new hires. As a by-product 
of his study of the hiring and jobs of less-educated workers, Harry 
Holzer has obtained  employer  data  on wages. He interviewed  a random 
sample of employers in four cities: Atlanta, Detroit, Boston, and Los 
Angeles. All of these employers  were asked about  the work conditions 
of new hires, including the last person hired. Weighting the data by 
employer size, Holzer shows that one year after a vacancy had been 
filled, only 4.8  percent of new hires had taken a wage cut.'7 These 
numbers  are larger  than  those implied  by our survey, and  are  also larger 
than  the recent  figures  for union  givebacks, but  they are  still quite small 
and, considering  that they refer only to new hires, are not inconsistent 
with the other  data. By contrast,  the PSID data  shows that 13.6 percent 
of new hires experience wage cuts in their first  year on the job.'8 
Other Ways to Cut Wage Costs 
Some may object that our attention  to downward  wage rigidity ig- 
nores other ways in which employers can reduce wage costs and so 
avoid the employment  effects that  we associate with this phenomenon. 
Firms could cut nonwage benefits, but we suspect that the scope for 
doing so is limited. Workers  would object to cuts in benefits, just as 
they object  to cuts in pay. Many  companies  have  recently  asked  workers 
to pay a larger share of the cost of health insurance,  but since health 
costs have, on average, been rising quite rapidly, in most cases such 
increases will only partly defray the companies' increasing costs for 
this benefit. 
Firms could also hire new workers at wages below those paid to 
16. Kahn  (1995, table 2, p. 17). 
17. Personal  communication  from Harry  J. Holzer, Michigan  State University,  East 
Lansing, Mich., April 20,  1995, and Holzer (1996). 
18. This is the fraction  of job stayers with one to two years of tenure  that reports 
lower wages in 1992 than in 1991. 18  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
existing  workers.  While  firms certainly  have  some  freedom  to adjust 
the wages of new hires, it is doubtful that this is important to our overall 
findings.  First,  the cost  of  new  labor will  not matter to a firm that is 
laying  off  workers.  Second,  a firm that is recovering  from a negative 
shock that has resulted in a nominal constraint on its wage setting may 
well  hire back laid-off  workers,  who  will  be paid their old wage.  Fi- 
nally,  even  a growing  firm does  not have complete  freedom in how it 
sets  its entry wages.  Consider  the controversy  that arose in the early 
1980s  when  a very few  firms adopted "two-tier"  salary systems  that 
allowed  newly  hired workers to be paid less  than those already on the 
job.  The  fact  that  this  practice  was  newsworthy  suggests  that  it  is 
infrequent,  and the worker resistance  to the plans that was reported at 
that time suggests  why. 
More subtly,  firms may avoid the customary wage increases associ- 
ated with merit and seniority.  In a firm that is maintaining its size  or 
growing while undergoing normal turnover, such increases will lead to 
a reduction in labor costs.  On the other hand, in a shrinking or stable 
firm with low turnover, the necessity  of granting some merit increases, 
or increases  with  seniority  or promotion,  can add an upward drift to 
labor costs.  Data from the PSID for average wage levels  by age cohort, 
which  are not sensitive  to the reporting errors that we discuss  above, 
permit us to estimate the size of normal wage gains of this type.  Mea- 
sured as the average  annual wage  change  for a cohort of job  stayers 
relative to the mean wage increase of all workers in the economy,  these 
averaged  1.2 percent a year between  1970 and 1992.  Freezing  all the 
wage increases normally associated  with merit, promotion, and senior- 
ity could provide savings  in unit labor costs  of about this amount. 
We allow for all these effects  in two ways.  First, both the simulation 
model and a version of the time-series  model presented below allow for 
a drift  of  individual  wages  relative  to  the  economy  mean  wage,  to 
capture the possibility  that firms erode nominal wage constraints in the 
ways just discussed.  Second, both models allow firms that are in distress 
to lower wages  to desired levels. 
Summary 
To conclude,  data on changes in wages and salaries that are relatively 
free of error strongly confirm the existence  of downward nominal wage George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  19 
Table 3.  Evidence  on Nominal  Wage and Salary  Rigidity 
Source  Nature of data  Summary 
Bureau of Labor  Changes in wages by  Negligible  fractions of both 
Statistics  employers making general  union and nonunion 
wage changes,  1959-78  employers making negative 
changes 
Authors' survey of  Phone survey of  1.7 percent with negative 
Washington area  respondents' wage changes  pay changes and no change 
in previous year,  1995  in job characteristics; 
additional 1 percent with 
changes in job 
characteristics 
Bureau of Labor  Contract settlements  2.3  percent of contracts 
Statistics  involving more than 1,000  with negative changes in 
workers  first year, average 1970-94 
Pierre Fortin  Canadian labor contracts  0.25  percent with wage 
without COLAs  cuts during 1986-88;  5.7 
percent with cuts and 47.2 
percent with wage freezes 
during 1992-94 
Panel Study of Income  Difference between  10.6 percent of wage 
Dynamics  consecutive responses of  earners and 24.3  percent of 
job stayers on wages and  salary earners with pay cuts 
salary 
Harry Holzer four-city  Changes in wages of new  4.84  percent of new 
study  employees  reported by  employees  with wage cuts 
firms hiring noncollege 
graduates 
O'Brien,  Hanes, and  Historical data  Considerable wage rigidity 
others  in prewar recessions 
Source: Authors' summary of studies described in text. 
rigidity. The results of different  studies are summarized  in table 3. All 
show an asymmetry  of wage changes about the mean, and all but the 
PSID show that negative wage changes are quite rare. We show that 
reporting  errors  in the PSID cause wage changes calculated  from that 
data to greatly exaggerate the actual frequency  of wage declines. In- 
deed, reporting  error in the PSID is sufficiently large to explain the 
difference between the distribution  of wage changes constructed  from 
the PSID and the other sources that we have described. 
Despite the pervasive evidence, some model builders  reject down- 
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who might accept the idea that wage cuts are rare  because they violate 
implicit contracts  between firms  and  workers  might, nonetheless, insist 
that the rigidity must apply to real rather  than nominal  wages. Having 
already provided direct evidence that downward  rigidity is,  in fact, 
widespread and applies to nominal wages, there is not much about 
wages that we can add in response. However, we would point to the 
existence of money illusion in another  familiar  context, the payment  of 
dividends. Our computations using CRSP data show a pattern that 
strongly  resembles  that  observed  for nominal  wage changes. Dividends 
are rarely cut, and the distribution  of changes in nominal  dividends is 
asymmetric  and bunched  at zero. 
Simulation Model 
In this section we present a formal model calibrated  to the major 
stylized facts concerning wage change, job change, and estimates of 
the lowest sustainable  rate  of unemployment  in the U.S. economy. This 
model rests on three  pillars:  monopolistic  competition, large heteroge- 
neous demand and supply shocks to different firms, and downward 
wage rigidity. 
These three characteristics  of the economy produce  a nonlinear  re- 
lation between long-run inflation and unemployment.  Supply and de- 
mand shocks are heterogeneous:  they affect firms  that are monopolist- 
ically competitive. For a variety  of reasons, workers  share  in the effects 
of firm-specific  shocks. For example, a positive demand  shock  to a firm 
will result in a rise in the wages of the workers  at that  firm, and also in 
an increase in employment. These job shocks thus cause both  job cre- 
ation and job destruction, and dispersion in wage changes. With this 
heterogeneity,  money wage rigidity  will act as a constraint  on the wage 
changes of some firms, even when wages in the economy as a whole 
are rising. The binding effect of downward  wage rigidity raises real 
wages and  decreases  employment.  The number  of constrained  firms  and 
the effects of the constraint  will be nonlinear  with inflation. 
Our simulation exercises are informed  by empirical findings about 
these features  of the U.S. economy. We have already  documented  from 
many sources the extent of downward  rigidity in money wages. We 
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MONOPOLISTIC  COMPETITION.  Monopolistic  competition  is a pervasive 
feature  of our economy. Very few prices are set in auction  markets  and 
virtually all firms have some discretion  in determining  the prices they 
charge. Robert  Hall and Mark  Bils both use the cyclical nature  of the 
U.S.  economy to infer the existence of extensive monopolistic com- 
petition from the observation  that small changes in employment  result 
in large changes in output.'9  An elasticity of demand  of  -3.8  in our 
simulation  model yields a labor share  of 0.73, as observed  in the U.S. 
economy in 1994. 
HETEROGENEITY  OF  WAGE  AND  EMPLOYMENT  CHANGES.  The third pillar 
of the model is heterogeneity in shocks to demand and supply. The 
U.S.  economy displays considerable  firm-level heterogeneity  in wage 
and employment changes. The simulation model has sufficient firm- 
level demand  and supply shocks to generate  these observations. 
Jonathan  Leonard and Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger,  and Scott 
Schuh have documented that each year, on average, growing firms 
increase employment  by an amount  equal to about 11 percent  of total 
employment,  while  shrinking firms contract employment by only 
slightly less.20 These numbers  change a little over the course of the 
business cycle, but whatever  the unemployment  rate, gross  job creation 
and gross job destruction  are much larger  than the corresponding  net 
changes. 
There  is also ample evidence of significant  heterogeneity  in both the 
level and change of wages across individuals  and firms. We have de- 
scribed a number  of studies that attempt  to measure  the distribution  of 
individuals' wage changes.2'  However, the standard  deviation  of aver- 
age wage changes for firms will be smaller than that for individuals. 
Using the BLS data for general wage increases for manufacturing  es- 
tablishments  cited above, we computed what the standard  deviation 
would be if the left half of the distribution  were symmetrical  with the 
right half. This approximates  what the standard  deviation would be in 
the absence of downward  rigidity. For 1964-78, but excluding the oil 
shock years of the early 1970s, this procedure  gives a median  standard 
19.  Hall (1988);  Bils  (1987). 
20.  Leonard (1987);  Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and Schuh (1996). 
21.  McLaughlin  (1994)  presents several  estimates  of the standard deviation  of per- 
centage real wage  growth across individuals  who stay on the same job.  These estimates 
are corrected for measurement error, and none is less  than 9.5  percentage points. 22  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
deviation of 2.8  percentage points. This is probably lower than the 
variation  in the change in the average  wage across firms, since demand 
conditions may force firms to pay more or less for specific types of 
labor and this may affect average wages. Also, we compute that the 
standard  deviation of negotiated  first-year  wage changes for the Cana- 
dian  contract  data  described  above  ranges  from  2 to 4 percentage  points, 
depending  on the year. 
We believe the distribution  of observed wages and wage changes 
reflects market  forces and the desires of firms  and  workers.  We further 
believe that if firms  are forced to pay higher  wages, they will hire less 
labor.22  The heterogeneity  of wage changes may reflect changes in the 
demand and supply of idiosyncratic  skills in small geographic  or oc- 
cupational markets. Alternatively, if  wages are set to satisfy wage 
norms and such norms depend on profitability,  or if wages reflect ex- 
plicit or implicit  bargaining,  wage changes  will depend  on firm  demand. 
Our simulation  model allows for either interpretation. 
Deriving the Simulation Model 
The simulation model is presented  in two parts. First, we describe 
the underlying  representative  firm model of monopolistic  competition 
and wage setting. We then show how the simulation model is con- 
structed  from  this model, by allowing a large  number  of simulated  firms 
to face different supply and demand  conditions and downward  money 
wage rigidity. Without  downward  wage rigidity and  heterogeneity,  our 
simulated economy has unique equilibrium  real wage and unemploy- 
ment rates. The behavior of this economy can be summarized  by the 
price setting and wage setting behavior of the monopolistically  com- 
petitive firms. 
PRICE DETERMINATION. Given  monopolistically  competitive  firms,  each 
with its own market  niche, the demand  for a firm's  output  (D) will be 
(1)  D  =  [(Mij5)(p/P)-P]/n, 
22.  See  Dickens  (1994)  for a discussion  of  the theoretical  and empirical  evidence 
on whether labor demand responds to negotiated changes  in wages; and Dickens  (1986) 
for a discussion  of the employment  effects  of  wage  changes  in firms where bargaining 
is implicit  or the threat of collective  action forces them to pay higher wages. George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  23 
where M is the money supply, p is the price of the firm's output,  p-  is 
the average price in the economy, and n is the number  of firms. The 
first factor, Ml/,  for simplicity, represents aggregate demand. The 
second factor in equation 1, (p/p-)-,  gives the downward  slope to the 
demand  for the firm's  product.  For a representative  firm  that  is charging 
the average  price, this term will be equal to one, since p will be equal 
to p-. Nonetheless, the presence of this term affects the equilibrium 
output  and  pricing  in the economy, since each firm  takes  pj  as given and 
sets prices to equate marginal  cost and marginal  revenue. 
Each firm  produces  output  (Q) in proportion  to labor input (L): 
(2)  Q  =  L. 
It is useful to normalize the labor force to equal one. So, letting the 
unemployment  rate be u, output  will be 1 -  u.23 
Given the level of their wages, firms  will choose prices to maximize 
profits. This maximization  will determine  individual  firms' prices, p, 
and  also the average  level of all prices, p-.  Once firms'  prices are  given, 
their  demand  is given according  to equation  1, and  so the level of output 
is also determined. 
WAGE  DETERMINATION.  In the absence of  any constraint against 
money wage cuts, the wage is assumed to result from an implicit or 
explicit bargain  between the firm  and its workers.  We call the result of 
this bargain  the notional  wage, since it is the wage that  would be set in 
the absence of any constraint  due to nominal  rigidities. 
Consistent with the idea that the notional wage is the consequence 
of an implicit or explicit bargain  between the firm  and the workers, it 
is a weighted average of two factors. This is the generalized Nash 
solution: the surpluses of firms and workers, geometrically weighted 
according  to bargaining  power, are maximized  with respect to the real 
wage. The firms' surplus consists of total revenues net of the wages 
paid  to the workers  and  fixed costs. The workers'  surplus  is their  wages 
net of their  opportunity  costs-their  expected  returns  if they looked for 
jobs elsewhere. 
23.  With labor productivity  (G,)  changing,  we  assume  that Q  =  G,L.  Also,  with 
changes in productivity,  we assume that fixed costs are proportional to full employment 
output, so they are proportional to G,, and that s, the value of leisure,  is also proportional 
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The bargained real notional wage,  w", per efficiency  unit is given by 
the formula24 
(3)  w'z =  a[(pD  - pf)l/jL]  +  (1  -  a)[(1  -  u) wl/pj  +  u s], 
where -w  is the average nominal wage,  u is the unemployment rate, a is 
an index of workers'  bargaining power that takes values between  zero 
and one,  s is the value  of the workers' time while  unemployed,  andf 
is the ratio of the fixed costs  of  the firm to the value of output at full 
employment.25 When worker bargaining power is equal to zero,  wage 
setting becomes  competitive,  with the real wage equal to the opportu- 
nity cost of time. 
Analysis  of the Representative  Firm Model 
The equilibrium of the representative firm model occurs at the inter- 
section  of an aggregate demand equation resulting from pricing behav- 
ior,  and an aggregate  supply equation resulting from the wage  setting 
model.  Both of these relationships  depend only on the real wage.  The 
aggregate  demand curve is the result of  monopolistically  competitive 
pricing.  Each firm chooses  its own price to maximize  revenues  net of 
payments to labor, taking the money wage and the aggregate price level 
as  fixed.  A  firm whose  demand  curve  has  constant  elasticity,  as  in 
24.  Such  a wage  equation  can be  easily  derived  as the generalized  Nash  solution 
when  firms and workers bargain over wages  but not employment.  If workers receive  a 
wage from the firm of w',  the surplus per worker left to the firm in nominal terms will be 
Sf =  p  -  p(flL)  -  wt, 
wheref  represents the fixed costs  of production.  We assume that the capital of the firm 
is firm-specific,  so it has no alternative use. 
A worker's  surplus for working for the firm is 
S,  =  w 11 -  w, 
where w,  is the worker's  opportunity cost.  This value of the worker's  alternative is,  in 
turn, a weighted  average.  If the worker must seek employment  elsewhere,  with proba- 
bility  u he or she will  be unemployed  and the value of staying at home will  be denoted 
by s,  which  includes  the unemployment  benefit; and with probability (1  -  u) that he or 
she will  be employed  and will,  on average,  receive  the average wage  in the economy. 
If w'  is chosen  to maximize  the geometric  mean of the firms' surplus and the workers' 
surplus-that  is, to maximize Sf  W-the wage will be given by the bargaining equation 
(equation  3). 
25.  We assume that s and profits rise with productivity,  and therefore,  productivity 
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equation 1, and with the production  function  of equation  2, will set its 
nominal  price, p, as a constant  markup  over the nominal  unit labor  cost. 
So the aggregate  demand  curve will be of the form 
(4)  w =  (,B -  1)/3, 
where w is the notional real wage. 
Equation 4  conforms to our reading of the character  of  the real 
wage-it  varies little with the cycle.  Some have argued  that the real 
wage is procyclic; others  have argued  that  it is countercyclic.  Equation 
4, which results from the constant  elasticity of demand  function, equa- 
tion 2, is embraced  as a compromise  between these two possible read- 
ings of the evidence. In figure  2, AA represents  equation  4. It gives the 
response of prices, relative to wages,  as a function of the level of 
demand  (or employment). Because the real wage is constant, AA is a 
horizontal  line. 
If the price equation, which is set taking wages as constant, is per- 
ceived as the aggregate  demand  equation,  its counterpart,  the aggregate 
supply curve, will be given by the wages that result from the wage 
determination  process, which are set with constant  price expectations. 
Thus the aggregate supply curve, which relates notional wages and 
unemployment,  will come out of equation  3. Noting that  in equilibrium 
p  =  p-, DIL  =  1, L  =  1  -  u, and wlp/j  =  (,B -  1)/,B equation 3 will 
yield 
(5)  w'  -a[(1  -f)/(1  -  u)]  +  (1  -  a)[(1  -  u)(3  -  1)/4  +  us]. 
This is curve SS in figure 2.  It slopes upward  because the value of 
workers' alternative  uses of their time rises-as  do profits-as  unem- 
ployment  falls.26  Along this curve, as employment  rises the bargained 
real wage rises. As employment increases, unemployment  declines, 
assuming  constant labor supply. 
LSRU not NAIR  U 
The equilibrium  unemployment  and real wage rates  in this economy 
occur at the intersection  of the AA and  the SS curves. We call this level 
of unemployment  the LSRU (lowest sustainable  rate  of unemployment). 
26.  As long as s, the value of leisure, is less than  the real wage, (,  -  1)/,3,  SS will 
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Figure 2. Reduced-Form  Price and Wage  Equations 
(I- 
Employment rate 
Source: Authors' model as described in text. 
In the absence of downward wage rigidity,  the LSRU would constitute 
the NAIRU  ("nonaccelerating  inflation"  rate of unemployment) of the 
model,  the level  of unemployment  at which inflation remains constant. 
With downward wage  rigidity,  however,  higher sustained rates of un- 
employment  accompany  very  low  rates of  sustained  inflation,  and a 
unique NAIRU  does  not exist. 
Adding Heterogeneity  and Wage Rigidity 
We now  add firm-level  heterogeneity  and nominal wage  rigidity to 
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DEMAND  AND  SUPPLY  HETEROGENEITY.  Heterogeneity  is  introduced 
by the addition of a random term, E,  to the demand for each individual 
firm. The demand equation,  equation  1, becomes 
(la)  D  =  (M/lp)(plp)-  eE In. 
The expected value of eE  is one because it represents the shocks specific 
to individual  firms. We also  assume that E is serially  correlated-fol- 
lowing  a simple AR(1) process.  The innovations to E are assumed to be 
normal with constant variance. 
We also add heterogeneity to the wage bargains with a supplementary 
random term, -q. The bargaining equation,  equation 5,  becomes 
-  a[(pD  -pf)/l5L] 
(5a) 
+  (1  -a)[(1  -  u)(r  -  1)/'  +  us]  +  'q. 
The term -  is an AR(1)  process  with mean zero and constant variance 
normal  innovations.  It can  be  thought  of  as  reflecting  idiosyncratic 
variation in bargaining power or change in labor supply conditions. 
Further realism is added by letting the bargained wage respond au- 
toregressively  to levels  of current variables,  such that 
=  (1  -  z)w-,  +  z {a[(pD  -pf)lJpL] 
(Sb) 
+  (1  -  a)[(1  -  u)(  -  1)/3  +  us]}  +  'q. 
MONEY  WAGE  RIGIDITY.  It remains to describe in detail the nature of 
money  wage  rigidity  in the simulation  model.  Complete  money  wage 
rigidity  is  too  stark.  Our survey  and the  interviews  by  Bewley  and 
Brainard suggest that wage cuts are quite rare; nevertheless,  sometimes 
they  do  occur.  Bewley  and Brainard suggest  that firms are likely  to 
make wage cuts after a second year of losses.  The interviews of Kahne- 
man,  Knetsch,  and Thaler  show  that most  respondents  would  view 
reductions in money  wages  as fair if a firm was losing  money.  In this 
spirit, our simulation allows  firms with two years of consecutive  losses 
to cut wages  to their notional  level.  When they do this,  we  also  give 
those firms with negative  E an increase in that term that leaves  E partway 
between  its former value  and zero. 
There are two possible  interpretations of these features of the model. 
On the one hand, releasing  the wage  constraint could be viewed  as an 
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losses.  In this case,  the increase in the firms' E reflects reorganizing for 
greater efficiency  as they cut wages.  Alternatively,  one might view  the 
firms as going out of business.  The workers in those firms find employ- 
ment in new  firms with no wage  history to constrain wage  setting.  In 
this case,  keeping  E  negative  would  reflect the disadvantages  experi- 
enced by new firms relative to established  firms. 
There  are further reasons  to relax  the downward wage  constraint. 
We  discussed  above  how  firms might  try to find alternative ways  to 
reduce  labor costs  if  money  wages  cannot fall.  This will  only  partly 
offset the effects  of downward wage rigidity in unit labor costs,  because 
either existing  employees  will  resist changes,  such as cuts in benefits, 
or the employer  will  be forced to adopt less  efficient  employment  ar- 
rangements.  The simulation allows  for all these ways in which employ- 
ers  can  circumvent  downward  wage  rigidity,  by  assuming  that con- 
strained  firms will  be  able  to  reduce  their labor costs  at the  rate of 
1 percent per year. 
To summarize the treatment of downward wage rigidity: the nominal 
wage  paid will  be a fraction (0.99)  of the previous money wage or the 
nominal notional wage,  whichever is greater, except in the case of firms 
with  two  consecutive  periods  of  losses.  For those  firms, the nominal 
wage  will  be  the notional  wage  for a firm with  the demand shift,  E, 
decreased  by a fraction of its value (if negative). 
INTUITIVE  WORKING  OF  THE  SIMULATION  MODEL.  The effects  of nom- 
inal wage  rigidity  in this model can also be seen in figure 2.  Nominal 
wage  rigidity  shifts  up the wage  setting equation (supply equation)  in 
figure 2 from SS to SS'.  The amount of the shift depends on the rate of 
inflation.  The resulting real wage  and employment  level  can be found 
at the intersection  of  the aggregate  demand curve and the shifted  ag- 
gregate  supply  curve.  With  a horizontal AA curve,  the real wage  is 
unchanged and all the effect of the shift is in employment.  We describe 
below  in greater detail the dynamics of this shift. 
Parameterization of Model and Simulation Results 
We now simulate the model to determine the effect  on employment 
and output  of  targeting  zero  inflation.  The  procedure  also  provides 
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parameters. Three come from the demand equation,  six from the wage 
setting  equation,  and one  determines  the behavior  of  firms that have 
two periods of negative profits. The parameters from the demand equa- 
tion are the elasticity  of demand (,B),  the standard deviation  (CyE)  of the 
innovation  in  E,  and the  first-order autocorrelation  of  E.  Parameters 
from the wage  setting  equation include  the bargaining power of labor 
(a),  the level  of  fixed  costs  (f),  the value  of  time  spent unemployed 
(s),  the degree  of  autoregression  in the wage  setting equation (z),  the 
standard deviation  (a,)  of  the  innovation  in  -q, and the  first-order 
autocorrelation of -q. 
Prior knowledge  does  not allow  us to specify  with confidence  the 
values  of all these parameters. A commonly  used alternative approach 
is  to  pick  a  number  of  characteristics  of  the  economy  equal  to  the 
number of  parameters,  and choose  the  parameter values  so  that the 
simulated values for those characteristics match the values for the actual 
economy.  However,  our simulation model is meant to characterize the 
behavior of the economy  along many fewer dimensions than the number 
of parameters.  So  we  simulate  the performance of the economy  for a 
large number of different combinations of parameter values,  where each 
combination  must  match  only  three  important characteristics  of  the 
economy:  an equilibrium rate of unemployment  at 3 percent inflation, 
the rate of job  creation and destruction,  and the standard deviation  of 
firm wage  changes.  To  do  this,  we  divide  the  parameters into  two 
groups: seven  parameters chosen  randomly,  and three parameters that 
we  use  as  instruments  to  hit  our three  targets.  For those  parameter 
combinations  that permit the model to converge,  we simulate the effect 
of reducing inflation from 3 percent to zero. 
We choose  the equilibrium rate of unemployment at 3 percent infla- 
tion as 5.8 percent, in accord with our perception that this is the median 
of existing  natural rate estimates,  and because the behavior of inflation 
over the last year and a half,  when the unemployment  rate has varied 
between  5.4  percent  and 6 percent,  suggests  an equilibrium  value  in 
that range.  We choose  job  creation and destruction to fit the observa- 
tions of Leonard and Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and Schuh cited earlier, that 
about 11 percent of jobs are created, and slightly fewer destroyed,  over 
the course of a year.27  Finally,  we choose to make the standard deviation 
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of  wage  change  equal  to  2.8  percent,  the  number cited  above  from 
manufacturing data. 
Simulation Procedure 
Given the three characteristics of the real economy  that we want our 
simulation  to display,  computational  strategy determines how the ten 
parameters of our model are divided into two groups: three instruments 
and seven parameters to be chosen  randomly. s,  (re  and a.  are chosen 
as the instruments because we know that the equilibrium unemployment 
rate is substantially affected by s, while the amount of churning in firm 
size  and the standard deviation  of wage  changes  are most directly  af- 
fected by cr, and or-,,  respectively. 
The  remaining  parameters  are chosen  uniformly  in  their relevant 
ranges.  The two autocorrelation parameters are chosen between  0 and 
1. The weight  on the share of profits is chosen  between  0 and 1. The 
elasticity  of  demand is chosen  between  2 and 6,  comfortably  encom- 
passing  the value  of  3.8  which  is consistent  with labor's  share in the 
U.S.  economy.  Fixed  costs  (times n) are chosen between 0.0  and 0.3, 
so as to keep total fixed costs below  capital's  share, which is less  than 
0.3.  The extent of reversion of the demand shock for reorganizing firms 
(those with two periods of negative profits) is chosen between 0 and 1. 
Finally,  the bargaining power of labor (a) is allowed to take any value 
between  0 and 1. 
For each  attempted simulation,  the seven  random parameter values 
are chosen first. Then the program, through an iterative process,  moves 
the  instruments  so  as to  match the three simulated  characteristics  to 
their target values-unemployment  of 5.8  percent,  a job creation rate 
of 0.1  1, and a standard deviation  of wage changes of 2.8  percent. The 
val,ue of  time  while  unemployed  (s)  is  restricted to exceed  0  in this 
exercise.  In over  80  percent  of  the cases,  it is  impossible  to hit the 
targets  given  the  values  of  the randomly  chosen  parameters and the 
restriction on S.28  When the program is able to find values for the three 
rigidity is overcome in the economy, and by embodying  this featur-e  we capture  this 
mechanism  in the simulation. Constrained  firms will tend to shrink, and workers  who 
lose employment  at high wage constrained  firms may find reemployment  at low wage 
unconstrained  firms. 
28.  We checked  a number  of these cases to be sure  that  the failure  to find  acceptable 
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instrumental parameters that allow  the simulation  to hit the three tar- 
gets,  it then simulates  the effect  of reducing the inflation rate from 3 
percent to zero and records the results. The process is repeated to obtain 
a reasonable number of simulation trials. 
Long-Run Simulation Results 
With 432  successful  runs of the simulation,  the median increase  in 
the equilibrium unemployment rate associated with operating with zero 
rather than 3 percent inflation is 2.1  percentage points.  The minimum 
value  obtained  is  0.6  percentage  points.  The  tenth percentile  of  the 
distribution of  unemployment  changes  is  1 percentage  point,  and the 
ninetieth percentile  is 5.7  percentage points.  The range containing  90 
percent of the simulated values runs from 0.8  percentage points to 8.5 
percentage points. 
To examine  the long-run relation between  inflation and unemploy- 
ment,  we choose  benchmark parameters to look  at a typical case,  and 
then adjust them slightly  to hit our three targets. We choose the elastic- 
ity of demand (,B) as 3.8  to yield  a labor share of 0.73,  and we set the 
bargaining power of labor (a)  at 0.2,  the fraction of fixed costs  (f)  at 
0. 15,  and the value  of time spent unemployed  (s)  at 0.38.  We set the 
standard deviation of demand shocks at 0.25  and the standard deviation 
of  shocks  to  the  wage  equation  at 0.02.  We  set  the  autocorrelation 
coefficients  for the two error processes  to 0.75  and the smoothing coef- 
ficient for wage bargaining (z) to 0.75.  Finally,  we reset the E of firms 
with two periods of negative  profits to half its former value (when,  as 
in the great majority of cases,  it was negative). 
The long-run Phillips curve corresponding to these parameter values 
is pictured in figure 3. The LSRU is,  by assumption,  5.8  percent. At 3 
percent inflation,  unemployment  is 5.9  percent,  only  0.1  point above 
the LSRU.  Equilibrium unemployment increases at an accelerating rate 
as inflation is held below  3 percent.  At 2 percent inflation,  it rises  to 
6.1  percent; at  1 percent,  to 6.5  percent; and at zero inflation to 7.6 
a failure  of our search  algorithm.  Doing a grid search  by hand, we were unable  to find 
values of our instrumental  parameters  that allowed our simulation  to hit the three cali- 
bration  targets.  The failure  is due to the wide range  of values  that  we allow the randomly 
chosen parameters  to take. In experiments  where the ranges  are sharply  restricted,  the 
search  algorithm  is able to calibrate  the simulation  in the majority  of cases. 32  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Figure  3.  Long-Run  Phillips  Curve,  Simulation  Model 
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Source: Authors' calculations from simulation model. 
percent. Deflation is yet worse: with 1 percent deflation, the equilibrium 
unemployment  rate rises to 10.0  percent. 
A  HEURISTIC  EXPLANATION.  The  higher  unemployment  associated 
with  zero  inflation  should  be  no  surprise.  Define  S  as the difference 
between  average  actual  and average  notional  wages,  divided  by  the 
expected  price  level.  The increase  in S associated  with going  from 3 
percent to zero inflation acts like  a permanent real cost  shock,  which 
producers will  try to pass on to their customers.  Notional  real wages 
must fall sufficiently  to offset  this real cost shock.  And lower notional 
real wages  require higher unemployment.  Any attempt-for  example, 
through  stabilization  policy-to  maintain  employment  at  its  former 
level  but with the cost  shock  equal to S,  would  require prices  higher 
than expected  prices.  This disequilibrium expectation  only goes  away 
as higher inflation takes S back to its initial level. 
Figure 2 helps in understanding this change in the equilibrium level 
of  unemployment.  The  wage  setting  curve,  SS,  and the  actual wage 
curve at zero inflation,  SS',  will differ by S. This difference will be the 
consequence  of downward wage rigidity.  Since the AA curve is flat, the 
increase in unemployment-the  shift from E to E'-will  be the product 
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benchmark case,  S increases from almost zero to 1 percent of wages  as 
long-term inflation falls from 3 percent to zero. Calculation shows that 
with the benchmark parameters, the slope of the wage setting equation 
is  about two,  and therefore the change  in the unemployment  rate is, 
likewise,  approximately 2 percentage points. 
The argument why the slope of the wage setting equation with respect 
to  the  unemployment  rate  will  be  the  appropriate multiplier  of  the 
increase in wages due to downward rigidity follows  in three steps. First, 
each level  of  steady-state  inflation is associated  with a given  constant 
value  of  S.  Second,  for  any such  value  of  S,  there will  be  only  one 
employment  level  with  constant  inflation.  This  is  so because  in each 
period with an expected  price level  pc,  the average nominal wage will 
be set equal to  pe(wn  +  S),  where  wn  is  the notional  wage.  The price 
will  be set as the markup over this actual wage,  [,B/(,B  -  1)] pe(on  + 
S).  If ((n  +  S) exceeds  (,  -  1)/,B, actual prices will exceed  expected 
prices and there will be accelerating  inflation. Similarly,  if (otY +  S) is 
less than (,  -  1)/,B,  p will be less thanpe and there will be decelerating 
inflation.  As  a result,  the only  point  in the diagram where there is  a 
constant inflation rate of zero,  and where the value of S corresponds to 
zero inflation,  will  be E'.  Third, if a constant level  of zero inflation is 
to be maintained, as in the diagram, the unemployment rate must exceed 
the LSRU (which  is unemployment  at E) by S times the slope  of SS. 
The slope  of this wage  settlement  equation can be estimated  fairly 
robustly. It is the inverse slope of the Phillips curve with respect to the 
unemployment  rate. In our estimations  reported below,  it is very close 
to two. 
PROPORTION OF FIRMS CONSTRAINED.  The nonlinear response  of  un- 
employment to inflation is mirrored in the fraction of constrained firms, 
as shown in table 4. As inflation falls from 3 percent to zero, the fraction 
of constrained firms rises from 5 percent to 33 percent. The fraction of 
firms making readjustments as a result of two periods of negative profits 
rises  as inflation falls,  but this change  is small.  This behavior occurs 
because,  following  Leonard and Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and Schuh,  we 
set the rate of job creation and destruction very high, even at the LSRU. 
This means that a considerable  fraction of businesses  will  be making 
readjustments even  at high  and moderate rates of  inflation,  and their 
number will  not  increase  much  as  inflation  falls  and unemployment 
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Table 4.  Unemployment  and Firms  Constrained  and Reorganizing, 
by Rate of Inflation 
Percent 
Firms constrained  Firms 
Inflation  Unemployment  in wage setting  reorganizing 
10  5.8  0  3.1 
7  5.8  0.2  3.1 
5  5.8  1  3.2 
4  5.8  2  3.2 
3  5.9  5  3.3 
2  6.1  10  3.4 
1  6.5  19  3.6 
0  7.6  33  3.9 
- 1  10.0  53  4.3 
Source: Authors' calculations from simulation model. 
Checks for  Robustness 
The  simulation  is  most  sensitive  to three parameters: the value  of 
time unemployed  (s),  the bargaining power of labor (a),  and the stan- 
dard deviation of the innovation to the wage bargain ((re).  Figure 4 plots 
the simulated change  in the equilibrium unemployment rate between  3 
percent  and zero inflation for different values  of s.  This parameter is 
chosen  to obtain  an unemployment  rate of 5.8  percent at a simulated 
inflation  rate of  3  percent,  given  the  values  of  the  seven  randomly 
chosen  parameters. When those randomly chosen parameters dictate a 
value of s that is close  to the average real wage,  employment becomes 
very sensitive  to small changes  in the wage,  exacerbating the effect  of 
nominal rigidity.  For values  of s below  0.45,  there are no simulations 
where the increase in unemployment is greater than 5 percentage points. 
When  the bargaining  power  of  labor (a)  is  small,  demand shocks 
have little or no effect  on wages.  To reach the target standard deviation 
of wage  changes,  the simulation  increases the variation of the innova- 
tion to the bargaining equation (a,).  The responsiveness  of unemploy- 
ment to a zero inflation target depends on the nature of the variation in 
wages.  Figure 5 shows that as the bargaining power of labor increases, 
the effects  of zero inflation decline  considerably. 
The other parameters have much smaller effects  on the change in the 
unemployment  rate. Higher values of the autocorrelation coefficient  in 
the wage  determination process  (z) and the error process  in the wage 
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Figure 4. Simulated  Changes  in Unemployment  vs. the Value  of Leisure (s)a 
Change  in unemployment  (percentage  points) 
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Source: Authors' simulations. 
a. Calculating the change in unemployment associated with operating at zero rather than 3 percent inflation. 
unemployment  rate of  about  1.5  percentage  points  over their ranges. 
Other parameters are associated  with still smaller differences. 
In  a  very  large  fraction  of  the  cases  in  which  we  are unable  to 
calibrate the simulation,  the reason is that the only value of time spent 
unemployed  (s) that would yield  an unemployment  rate of 5.8  percent 
was negative.  We experiment with allowing  a lower bound of  -  1  for 
this parameter, instead of 0. When we do this the median change in the 
unemployment rate declines  to 1.3 percentage points and the minimum 
value observed in 722 trials is 0.3 percentage points. The fifth percentile 
of the distribution is 0.4  percentage points. 
Finally,  the  simulation  is  predictably  sensitive  to  the  assumption 
about the  conditions  under which  firms are allowed  to  reduce  their 
wages.  We conduct a number of runs in which we allow firms to escape 
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Figure 5. Simulated  Changes in Unemployment  vs. Workers'  Bargaining  Power  (a)a 
Change  in unemployment  (percentage  points) 
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Source: Authors' simulations. 
a. Calculating the change in unemployment associated with operating at zero rather  than 3 percent inflation. 
for only one period, rather  than  two. When  we do this for 289 simulation 
runs, there are a couple in which there is no measurable  change in the 
equilibrium  unemployment  rate between 3 percent  and zero inflation. 
The median  change drops  to 1.5 percentage  points and  the fifth  percen- 
tile of the distribution  is 0.2 percentage  points. 
A Model for Estimation 
A model derived  as an approximation  to the simulation  model yields 
an equation for inflation that can be estimated by nonlinear least 
squares. We add a term reflecting the effects of downward  wage rig- 
idities to the standard  accelerationist  Phillips curve (for example, as George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  37 
estimated  by Robert  Gordon).29 We denote this additional  term S, be- 
cause it is the shift in expected unit labor  costs arising  from downward 
wage rigidity. S, is defined as the gap between the average level of 
expected real actual and notional wages deflated  by labor productivity 
(G,): S, =  (w-,  -  W-1)/  pt  G,. The shift in unit labor costs because of 
downward  wage rigidity should have the same effect on the Phillips 
curve as a change in unit labor costs for any other  reason. As a conse- 
quence, S, enters the price Phillips curve linearly, as if it were a shift 
to the wage setting equation. 
S, is determined  by the behavior of its two components, the actual 
wage and the notional wage. The notional wage is determined  by the 
wage setting equation, and will therefore  depend on the level of un- 
employment. Because of downward  wage rigidity, the actual wage of 
each firm this period is either the notional wage of this period or the 
actual wage of last period, whichever is greater. Thus actual wages 
depend  on past wages, and hence S, depends  on its own past value. We 
derive how S, enters the Phillips curve, and then explain the recursion 
in which S, is a function of S,t  and other  variables. (Further  details of 
these derivations  are provided  in appendix  A.) 
The Augmented Phillips  Curve 
In this intermediate  model, S, enters as an additional  linear variable 
in an otherwise  conventional  Phillips curve. To understand  why this is 
so, it is useful to consider how a price Phillips curve can be derived 
from  a wage setting  equation.  In the absence  of nominal  wage rigidities, 
expected  real wages for this period  will be the real notional  wage. Thus 
the nominal wage will be the product  of the expected price level and 
the notional  real wage: 
(6)  wt  ,=pe 
Today's price will be the product  of the markup  factor (m) and unit 
labor cost, so that 
(7)  pt  =  m pe Wn/Gt. 
The usual Phillips curve is derived  by taking  the natural  log of equation 
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7, subtracting  the natural  log of p,_,  from both sides, and expressing 
the natural  log of w,;  in terms of its arguments.  The equation that we 
estimate  is derived  by exactly the same process. But because  of nominal 
wage rigidity, the average wage will be higher than  pte  n  by peG, S,, 
and  thus, with the markup,  the price level will be higher  by MpeS,.  Thus 
with nominal rigidity, the current wage and the current  price for a 
representative  firm  are given by the modified  equations 
(6a)  w,  =  pe (1  +  S,Gt/Wn)Wn 
and 
(7a)  p,  =  m pe(l  +  S,G,tlWn)W/G,, 
respectively. The estimation  equation  is obtained  by taking  the natural 
log of each side of equation  7a and subtracting  the natural  log of p,_, 
from both sides of the equation. Because the difference between the 
notional wage and the actual wage will be small in equilibrium,  w;IG, 
can be approximated  as (1  -  1)/1 and therefore, the natural  log of 
(1 +  S,G,tWn)  is approximately  equal to [1/(1  -  1)]S,. We also ap- 
proximate  the wage setting equation  (equation  5) as a loglinear  function 
of unemployment.  This yields as the equation  to be estimated 
(8)  =rr,  ='te 
+  c-au,  +  S 
where TF, is the rate of price inflation and 
are is the expected rate of 
price inflation. 
Equation  8 is the usual  accelerationist  Phillips  curve  with  the addition 
of the term [,B/(1 -  1)]S,. It remains  to determine  a recursion  equation 
for S,, which is otherwise unknown, so that it can be jointly estimated 
with the other terms in this augmented  Phillips curve. 
The Recursive Nature of St 
In the recursion equation, S, depends on its past values and other 
variables. To begin the derivation, recall the definition S, =  (-w,  - 
Wt )/p,'  G,.  Because  of  downward wage  inflexibility,  the wage  of  each 
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of the previous  period.  Thus  S, can  be inferred  from  the  joint distribution 
of w_  -and  w7. 
We assume that for each firm, w,_, and wn have a bivariate  normal 
distribution,  and that the means of this distribution  vary over time but 
the standard  deviations and the covariance, when normalized  by the 
expected price level (p,) and by trend  productivity  (G,), are constant. 
This makes sense as an approximation,  since in the long run nominal 
wages will be proportional  to both productivity  and prices. We choose 
the expected rather  than the actual price for the normalization  of the 
standard  deviation, since St  is the difference  between  notional  and  actual 
wages, which are set on the basis of expected rather  than  actual  prices. 
Given that for each firm w, is  simply the maximum of w,_,  and 
w;?, the difference between w, and wn will equal the expected value of 
(w,t_  -  wn)  when (w,_  -  w,)  is greater  than zero, multiplied  by the 
probability  that (w,_, -  w;l) is greater  than zero. Define the new vari- 
able,  v,  =  [  -  w-tp  G,.  If w,_,  and w7 have a bivariate normal 
distribution,  their difference will have a normal  distribution,  and the 
expected value of the truncated  normal  will be 
C  E((wt  -  wIt)  I  -  wt)>O)  Pr (wt  -  wI>O) 
Ut  peG 
(9)  pe G 
=  o  4)(v,/to)  +  F(v,/cuo)v,, 
where 4 and 1 are, respectively, the standard  normal  density function 
and the cumulative normal distribution  function (see appendix A for 
the proof). 
Equation  9 expresses S, as a nonlinear  function  of v,. To obtain the 
recursion  for our estimation, one needs to express v, as a function of 
St  and current  and past values of other variables. This comes from 
the decomposition  of v, as the difference of two components, 
-  i;:ni~  n  -  T  (10)  -~~~~wt_  I  w- I,_  _T  W-t  -  It_ 
(10)  v,=-___ 
The first term of the decomposition is a multiple of S,_,:  pt _1G,t_/ 
peG,. The second term  of the decomposition  is the same multiple  of the 
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product  is approximated  from the markup  equation  as (  -  1)/1; the 
second factor, the percentage change in the notional wage, ptw7, is 
approximated  as  Ftee  +  g,  -  a(u,  -  u,1),  where  Ftee  is the rate of 
change  of price expectations  and  g, is the growth  of productivity.  Hence 
the recursion  formula  for v, in terms of St__  is 
11)  =  S  -  [(1  -  1)/P][  ee+  g-  a(u,  -  u,_,)] 
t  +  ,ee  ~~~+  gt 
(see appendix A for greater detail). In terms of expected and actual 
price inflation,  , ee  is given by 
(12)  pee  I  -  ln pe_1  _  le  +  nt_I  -IS 
where 
(13)  se  _ 0t  =  _ I  +  (1  -  t)  r,t-2- 
The estimation  equation  must also take account  of the feature  of the 
simulation model whereby firms under extreme duress are allowed to 
reduce their wages.  We introduce this feature into the equation by 
assuming that v, will decline if there is a drop in the profit share of 
GDP, denoted r. This yields the final element of the equation  that we 
estimate: 
St-  [(  -  1)/3][rr  ee  +  g,  -  a(u,  -  ut,_)] 
(14)  V,  =  1  +  Tree  +  g 
+  d (r,  rt-  ), 
where r, is the share of profits  in GDP. 
We estimate the augmented  Phillips curve of equation  8 jointly with 
the formula  for St  in terms  of v, (equation  9), v, in terms  of S-, l(equation 
14), and the formation  of price expectations  (equations  12 and 13). We 
estimate the five parameters:  c and a in equation 14, co in equation  9, 
d in equation 14, and ot  in equation 13. The parameter  1 is unidentified 
and  is assumed  to equal  3.8-as  in the benchmark  simulation  t Changing 
this value does not affect the impact  of nominal  constraints. 
Explanation  of the Recursion Formula for  St 
First, it is important  to understand  why S, should depend on v,; v, 
represents the gap between the average wage of last period and the 
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To gain an intuitive appreciation  for these equations, it is useful to 
see how St responds to different values of v, according  to equation  9. 
Consider  first two extremes. When almost all firms  are constrained,  v, 
will be very large. In this case, the first  term  in equation  9 will be zero. 
The second term will be equal to v,. From  the definitions  of S, and v,, 
wages in this period will be exactly equal to wages last period, which 
is what should happen  if all firms are constrained.  On the other hand, 
if v, is very negative, as it would be with very high inflation, no firms 
will be constrained;  and there will be no difference between notional 
and  actual  wages. This corresponds  to a value of S, that  is close to zero. 
Both the first term and the last term of equation  9 will be zero. By the 
definition  of S,, the actual wage will be equal to the notional  wage, as 
should be the case without binding wage constraints. Between these 
two extremes, the second term of equation  9 determines  the extent to 
which formerly  constrained  firms  continue  to be constrained,  while the 
first term represents the effects on firms that did not have binding 
constraints  last period, but whose wage constraints  have become bind- 
ing in this period. At low levels of inflation  and productivity  growth, 
this term will cause S, to grow. 
It remains  to explain the arguments  and the form of equation 11, for 
v,. Consider  that v, and  S,_, differ in their  numerators  by the difference 
Wt-  wt-  I,  while the denominators differ by a factorp  G, /pt  _Gt,.  It 
should therefore  be no surprise  that equation 11, which expresses v, as 
a function  of S,_  ,  should have as arguments  the growth  of inflationary 
expectations, the growth of productivity,  and the change in the unem- 
ployment rate, which are the major  determinants  of the change in the 
notional  wage. 
The economic reasons  why each of these three  arguments  will affect 
S, should be clear. Productivity growth and inflation will raise the 
notional  wage and  therefore  narrow  the gap between  actual  and  notional 
wages. A rise in the unemployment  rate, on the other  hand, will reduce 
the notional wage and therefore  will increase the gap between actual 
and notional wages.  The exact form of the relation between v, and S,_, 
as a function  of these change  variables  (equation  I 1) reflects  the weights 
that must be attached  to these change variables  as a result of the form 
of the difference between v, and S,_ . 
In sum, equation 9 modulates the change in S, according to the 
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9 and 14 give the appropriate  weights to inflation,  productivity  growth, 
and changes in unemployment  in changing  St. By raising the notional 
wage, inflation and productivity growth erode the gap between the 
actual and the notional wage, whereas  increases in unemployment  de- 
crease  the notional  wage, and  therefore  increase  that  gap. This behavior 
should  be kept in mind in our examination  of prices and  the predictions 
of S, in the Great  Depression. 
Time-Series Estimation 
We fit our model to annual  time-series data using the log change in 
the GDP deflator  to measure  inflation.  We use the aggregate  unemploy- 
ment rate because we want to predict  historical  periods  out of sample, 
for which only the aggregate  rate is available. And we use the ratio of 
corporate  profits  to GDP, with the 1954-84 trend  removed, to measure 
the change in the profit share. For comparison, we also fit a standard 
natural  rate model to the same data  by omitting  S, from the regression. 
The first two columns of table 5 give the regression  estimates for the 
postwar years 1954-95:  equation 5-1 is the natural  rate model and 
equation  5-2 is our downward  rigidity model.30 
The estimates in equation 5-1 are unremarkable  and the implied 
minimum sustainable rate of unemployment,  the LSRU here, is 5.9 
percent, which is typical of natural  rate estimates for such models. 
Equation  5-2 fits the data  slightly better. Inflation  enters  with a shorter 
lag than  in the standard  model and the implied  LSRU is 5.2 percent. In 
the parameters  estimated in forming S,, the standard  deviation of the 
desired  change  in real productivity  adjusted  wages is 2.9 percent,  which 
is very near the value that we estimate for the distribution  of general 
manufacturing  wage changes, discussed  above. The profits  term  has the 
expected sign and a magnitude  that  would make  its effect noticeable  in 
providing  some relief from wage constraints.  We are not surprised  that 
the estimate has a high standard  error,  since we did not expect, and do 
not find, much variation  in S, during the postwar years. This lack of 
variation  is apparent  from  the bottom  panel  of figure  6, and  is the reason 
30.  Our treatment  of productivity  growth, oil shocks, and wage and price controls 
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Table 5. Regression  Estimates  of Phillips  Curve Models of Inflationa 
Period of estimation and model 
1954-95  1929-42  Combined sample 
Downward  Downward  Downward 
Independent  Standard  rigidity  rigidity  Standard  rigidity 
variable  (5-1)  (5-2)  (5-3)  (5-4)  (5-5) 
Constant  0.031  0.026  0.027  -0.003  0.033 
(0.008)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.008)  (0.004) 
Inflation t-1  0.68  0.83  1.16  1.06  0.97 
(0.16)  (0.22)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.11) 
Inflation t-2  0.32  0.17  -0.16  -0.06  0.03 
Unemployment  -0.52  -0.50  -0.59  0.04  -0.62 
(0.13)  (0.13)  (0.24)  (0.08)  (0.03) 
Parameters of S 
Uob  0.029  0.013  0.029 
(0.012)  (0.085)  (0.008) 
Profit rate  0.53  0.24  0.33 
coefficient  (1.36)  (0.19)  (0.11) 
Summary statistic 
R  2  0.82  0.84  0.87  0.45  0.88 
N  42  42  14  56  56 
Addendum 
LSRU  5.9  5.2  4.6  .  .  .  5.3 
Source: Authors' regressions using data described in appendix A. Standard  errors are shown in parentheses. 
a. The dependent variable is the log change in the GDP deflator. 
b. (o( is the standard  deviation of the gap between lagged wages and notional wages,  (%v,-  I -  w,'_ )Ip'G,. 
why there is little basis for choosing between the conventional  model 
and our model in postwar  time series. 
The top panel of figure  6 gives the values of St for the Great  Depres- 
sion, as generated  in a dynamic simulation  of equation  5-2, described 
below. The variations  of S, during  this period  are  an order  of magnitude 
larger than the variations in the postwar  years. And as we show, the 
significance of the new model becomes apparent  when equations 5-1 
and  5-2 are used to predict  out of sample  the developments  in the Great 
Depression. 
The Great Depression 
Understanding  the performance  of the economy in the Great  Depres- 
sion of the 1930s has long been a challenge to economists. Most con- 44  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Figure 6. Wage  Constraint  Term, S 
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Source: Authors' estimates for equation 5-2 of table 5,  using data described in appendix A. George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  45 
spicuously, theories of inflation  based on the natural  rate  of unemploy- 
ment are unable to account for developments after 1933 because the 
historically high unemployment  rates that prevailed  between that year 
and World  War  II predict  accelerating  deflation  in natural  rate models. 
Schultze's Brookings paper, and Gordon's discussion of that paper, 
both infer that in conventional models fit to the Great Depression, 
effects from the level of unemployment  on inflation  are absent  and  only 
change effects matter.31  The Great Depression thus provides a strong 
test of the model developed here. 
OUT-OF-SAMPLE  PREDICTIONS  FOR  THE  GREAT  DEPRESSION.  We  use 
equation 5-2, which has been fit to the 1954-95 period, to produce a 
dynamic  simulation  of price changes during  the Great  Depression. For 
this purpose,  S, is constructed  by assuming  a value of zero in 1924 and 
using actual  values of inflation  up to 1929, when  the dynamic  simulation 
begins. For years after 1929, the model-generated  values of inflation 
are  used to compute  inflationary  expectations,  both in generating  S, and 
in the conventional  part  of our inflation  equation. No attempt  is made 
to predict the years between 1942 and 1954, which comprise World 
War II and the Korean  War, and the associated price controls. A new 
dynamic  simulation  is begun in 1954, with S, constructed  by assuming 
a value of zero in 1947 and using actual values of inflation  until 1954. 
The predicted and actual values of inflation are given in figure 7, 
where they are compared  with values from equation  5-1, the conven- 
tional natural  rate  equation.  The model with downward  nominal  rigidity 
captures  the price movements  remarkably  well, both during  the onset 
of the Great  Depression  and, more  important,  during  the recovery  years 
and the sharp  second collapse later in the 1930s. 
The severity  of the downturn  that  started  in 1929 destroyed  corporate 
profits. In 1930 such profits  fell to one-third  of their 1929 levels, and 
the following two years produced  aggregate  losses. Our  model predicts 
that  under  these conditions, downward  rigidity  would give way in many 
firms, and as shown in figure 6, S, declines to its minimum  value of 
zero in 1930-31  and the model predicts falling prices. In these early 
years of the decade, our model and the conventional model predict 
about equally well. Subsequently,  the negative inflation  rates begin to 
overwhelm  other  effects; S, becomes slightly positive in 1932 and very 
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Figure 7. Dynamic Simulations  of Inflation, 1929-42 and 1954_95a 
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Source: Authors' dynamic simulations, using equation 5-2 for the model with downward rigidity and equation 5-1 for the 
standard  model; both equations are found in table 5.  Data used are described in appendix A. 
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large  by  1933,  indicating  that downward  rigidity  is  acting  strongly 
against the deflation predicted by the conventional  variables. For 1933, 
the conventional  model predicts price declines of over 20 percent, while 
our model  predicts inflation.  Once profits turn up in 1934,  our model 
tracks the remainder of the decade reasonably well,  including the period 
of  sharp contraction  and recovery  later on,  when  the variations  in S, 
resemble those of the early  1930s,  but with a smaller amplitude. 
Additional Estimnates  and Tests 
We examine  the robustness of the findings based on equation 5-2 in 
a number of ways.  Equation 5-3 estimates the model for the Depression 
years alone.  Considering  the very  few  degrees  of  freedom  available, 
the estimates  of coefficients  and parameters of S, are remarkably close 
to those in equation 5-2.  An F test fails to reject the hypothesis  that the 
structure for the postwar period and the Great Depression  are the same. 
Equations 5-4 and 5-5 combine the data for the two periods. As expected, 
the standard model,  equation 5-4,  fits very poorly and estimates no un- 
employment effect.  Our downward rigidity model yields estimates not far 
from those for either subperiod, though the parameters  are estimated more 
precisely.  This  is  not  surprising, since  the Great Depression  provided 
much more variation relevant to estimating the parameters  of S,. 
We conduct several other experiments for robustness that are not re- 
ported in table 5. The change in the unemployment rate is often included 
in Phillips curve models.  However,  it is insignificant when we add it to 
our model for any of the periods, and has no impact on the estimates of 
other parameters. We also test the idea that there would be a significant 
amount of leakage from nominal wage constraints  as a result of job switch- 
ing by workers, which would eliminate wage increases normally associ- 
ated with seniority, or other mechanisms that would not actually violate 
downward wage rigidity for individual job slots. To test for such effects, 
which would show up as a drift in average wages relative to the wage 
setting captured in our model,  we adjust the model by adding a constant 
term to the equation for v,. However,  that parameter is estimated to be 
near zero and insignificant, and has no effect on the rest of the estimates. 
Since the functional form for the inclusion of profits in our model is 
chosen arbitrarily and is not derived from the microeconomic model in 
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native  specifications.  The  postwar estimates  of  the role  of  profits are 
sensitive to our choice of specification. However, the ability to track the 
general characteristics of the Great Depression in out-of-sample forecasts 
is preserved in all the models that we try. Furthermore,  the estimates using 
the combined  pre-  and postwar  data are remarkably  robust to these 
changes. We also test the effect of dropping the constraint that the coef- 
ficient on expected  inflation equals  1.0  (the constraint that enforces the 
natural  rate hypothesis). Without this constraint, the freely estimated coef- 
ficients are not far from 1.0 and there is no substantial  change in the other 
parameters of the model. 
Finally,  the basic results reported here are also obtained with a form 
of the microeconomic  model that allows the price-wage  margin to vary 
in response to shocks received  by firms. Such a model was used in the 
draft of this paper that was presented at the Brookings  Panel meeting. 
Because  that earlier  version  resulted  in procyclical  variations  in the 
price-wage  margin, and because such cyclical  variation is not an agreed 
upon characteristic  of  the economy,  we  have  modified  the model  as 
presented here. The earlier version produced all the qualitative results 
reported here,  including  the tracking of the Great Depression  and the 
consistency  of the coefficient  estimates  across periods. 
Ideally,  we  would check  the model  against wages  and hourly com- 
pensation,  as well as price behavior during the Great Depression.  How- 
ever,  the available  data refer to manufacturing alone and, as the infor- 
mal  table  below  shows,  their  behavior  is  suspect,  at least  for  our 
examination of aggregate inflation. The table shows the increase in real 
compensation  and in productivity for the nonfarm business  sector. The 
thirteen-year  interval  1929-42  spans the Great Depression,  ending  in 
the first year in which the unemployment rate stayed below  10 percent. 
The adjoining thirteen-year intervals are shown for comparison:32 
Real compensation  Productivity 
Period  (percent increase)  (percent increase) 
1916-29  29.6  36.8 
1929-42  70.3  25.6 
1942-55  44.3  39.3 
32.  U.S. Department  of Commerce  (1966, series B72, pp. 202-03, and  series  A164, 
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According  to these  data, real compensation  in manufacturing rose by 
an  astounding  70  percent  over  the  course  of  the  Great Depression, 
alongside  a rise of just  26 percent in productivity.  In the prosperous 
adjoining periods,  real compensation  rose by far less,  while productiv- 
ity rose by substantially  more.  Perhaps the compensation  data are ac- 
curate and measure a historic increase in relative compensation  for the 
manufacturing  sector.  Some  increase  is  consistent  with  the  growing 
strength of manufacturing unions during the period,  although the mag- 
nitude still seems large. But regardless of whether the data are accurate 
for the manufacturing sector, they cannot be useful to our inquiry about 
aggregate  inflation.  So our quantitative exploration  is confined to ex- 
plaining price inflation. 
Alternative Stabilization Paths 
The empirical  success  with  time-series  estimation  lends  important 
support to the simulation model and to its demonstration that maintain- 
ing complete  price stability increases the economy's  sustainable rate of 
unemployment.  We now use the empirical model to illustrate this point, 
by comparing economic  performance under alternative inflation targets 
pursued by the monetary authority. In figure 8, the economy  starts with 
both unemployment  and inflation  at 6  percent.  Then policy  is  set  to 
reduce the inflation rate by 1 point a year until it reaches its target level. 
In one case  the target is zero inflation,  and in the other it is 3 percent 
inflation.  Productivity  growth  is  set  at  1.5  percent  a year,  which  is 
about 0.5  percent faster than the disappointing trend that has held since 
the 1970s,  but is still only about one-half the trend achieved in the first 
thirty postwar years.  Because  we have no way to generate changes  in 
profits for this projection,  the two paths are calculated  from equation 
5-2,  holding  profits constant in forming S,. 
For the first three years,  inflation declines  by the targeted 1 point a 
year  and unemployment  rises.  In the  fourth year,  the  two  paths for 
unemployment diverge sharply as the target inflation rates also diverge. 
In the case  of  steady  3 percent inflation,  the target has been  reached 
and unemployment  declines.  By  year five,  the steady  state is  nearly 
achieved  at a sustainable unemployment  rate of 5.8  percent. 
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Figure 8. Alternative  Stabilization  Paths, Zero and 3 Percent  Inflation  Targetsa 
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Source: Authors' dynamic projections, based on equation 5-2 of table 5. 
a. Starting from 6 percent inflation. 
the third year. Moreover,  the effects  of wage rigidity mount as inflation 
approaches zero,  increasing the incremental unemployment cost of re- 
ducing  inflation  further. The  zero  inflation rate target is  not reached 
until  the  sixth  year,  at which  point  unemployment  has reached  10.8 
percent. Unemployment  declines  gradually from that point, nearing its 
steady-state rate of 8.4 percent after a decade. Comparing the two paths, 
the sustainable  rate of  unemployment  is 2.6  percentage points higher 
in the long run with the zero inflation target, a result broadly consistent 
with the steady-state results from the simulation model presented above. 
Conclusions and Implications 
We  demonstrate  the prevalence  of  downward wage  rigidity  in the 
U.S.  economy  and model  its  significance  for  the economy's  perfor- George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  5 1 
mance.  Downward rigidity  interferes with the ability of some  firms to 
make  adjustments  in real  wages,  leading  to  inefficient  reductions  in 
employment.  With trend growth  in productivity  near recent rates,  as 
the rate of  inflation approaches zero,  the number of firms constrained 
and the degree of their constraints increase sharply,  as does  this inef- 
ficiency and shortfall in employment.  The difference  in the sustainable 
rate of unemployment  between operating with a steady 3 percent infla- 
tion rate and a steady zero percent inflation rate is estimated as 1 to 2 
percentage points  in our simulation  model,  and 2.6  percentage points 
in the empirical  time-series  model.  The main implication  for policy- 
makers is that targeting zero inflation will  lead to a large inefficiency 
in the allocation  of resources,  as reflected in a sustainable rate of un- 
employment  that is unnecessarily  high. 
Some  might  argue that the behavior that we model  characterizes  a 
regime that will  change,  that a determined zero inflation policy  would 
break down  wage  rigidity.  We  have  several  thoughts  about this.  We 
suspect that wage rigidity is deeply rooted, not ephemeral or character- 
istic of a particular set of institutions or legal structures, although these 
may well  help to codify  it and expand the relations to which it applies. 
The psychological  studies that we cite treat as fundamental the notions 
of fairness and worker morale that appear to underlie nominal rigidity. 
Historical studies find downward rigidity present well  before the exis- 
tence of modern labor market laws  and institutions,  although whether 
to the same degree cannot be established  from the available evidence. 
We observe  that rigidity  breaks down at the firm level  when firms are 
under extreme duress,  a condition  that employees  can observe and are 
willing  to respond to; and we account for this behavior in our model. 
But this does not imply that rigidity in the aggregate is susceptible  to a 
permanent regime change following  analogous macroeconomic  condi- 
tions.  In the  Great Depression,  when  extreme  duress  became  wide- 
spread, downward rigidity initially gave way, but it did not break down 
permanently.  Eventually  laws  and  institutions  were  strengthened  to 
reinforce downward rigidity.  The idea that rigidity represents a partic- 
ular regime that will  disappear if the appropriate policies  are sustained 
would seem to have the sign wrong. 
There is a further question of whether one should want to eliminate 
downward rigidity,  even  if  one  could  do  so.  We  have  not addressed 
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vides a brake against runaway deflation. It is a feature of labor markets 
that stabilizes  the economy  against extreme outcomes  by reducing de- 
flationary expectations  and permitting real interest rates to fall,  thus 
preventing the bankruptcies that accompany debt deflation. Rather than 
either denying its importance,  which our analysis establishes,  or antic- 
ipating that it will  give  way  under some  policy  regime,  we  conclude 
that policy should be framed recognizing  the existence  and implications 
of downward rigidity. 
Finally,  our analysis  of  the macroeconomics  of low  inflation has a 
direct bearing on the public finance literature that evaluates the distor- 
tions in the tax system  that arise from nonzero inflation rates. In that 
literature, moving  to zero  inflation reduces  distortions  that exist  in a 
nominally  defined tax system.  A widely  used simplification  compares 
the present value  of  permanently removing  these  distortions  with the 
one-time  unemployment  cost  of  getting  inflation  to  zero.  In  such  a 
comparison,  even  small  permanent benefits  outweigh  large  one-time 
costs.  But our analysis  shows  that such a comparison  is invalid.  The 
unemployment  costs  are not one-time  but, rather, permanent and sub- 
stantial. Comparing low inflation rates with a zero inflation rate, we are 
convinced  that the unemployment  costs  outweigh  the costs  of tax dis- 
tortions.  We  fully  appreciate the benefits  of  stabilizing  inflation  at a 
low rate, and advocate that as an appropriate target for monetary policy. 
But the optimal inflation target is not zero. 
APPENDIX  A 
Derivation of the Estimation  Equation  and 
Specification  of the Estimation  and 
Dynamic Simulations 
THIS APPENDIX  presents the derivation of the estimated equations in the 
text, equations 8, 9, and 14, and explains the estimation procedure and 
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Derivation 
The derivation has two parts. The first part shows  how S,, which is 
the average increase in unit labor costs due to downward wage rigidity, 
will  enter  an augmented  Phillips  curve.  The  second  part shows  the 
derivation  of  the recursion relation of S,. S, is defined as the average 
gap between  expected  actual and notional real wages  adjusted for pro- 
ductivity:  S,  =  (w, --wt  )Ip,  G,. This shift in expected  real unit labor 
costs  has the  same  effect  on the Phillips  curve  as an increase  in the 
notional wage  relative  to productivity.  We first show that it will  enter 
the Phillips  curve in exactly  the same way  as the determinants of the 
notional wage from the wage  setting equation. 
Because  the current wage,  w,, for each firm depends upon last peri- 
od's  nominal wages,  downward nominal wage rigidity will  cause S, to 
have a recursive component. 
DERIVATION  OF  THE  AUGMENTED  PHILLIPS  CURVE.  We  use  the equa- 
tions  of  the  simulation  model,  modified  to  account  for  productivity 
growth,  to show  how the standard price-inflation  Phillips  curve is de- 
rived from price equations  and wage  setting equations in the presence 
of wages  constrained by downward rigidity. 
The  demand  function  for  each  firm is  exactly  the  same  as  in the 
simulation model: 
(A1)  D,  = 
[(M,tl,)(p,tlt,) -]3n. 
The production function is altered to reflect the rate of trend productivity 
growth,  so that 
(A2)  Q, =G,L,, 
where G, is labor productivity. 
Profit maximization by the firm yields the price, p,, as a markup over 
unit labor costs: 
fwt 
(A3)  Pt  (  -  )G, 
We now change the wage  setting equation to account for long-term 
growth in productivity.  We assume that the average real wage at other 
firms grows  with productivity,  as does  s,  the value of time when un- 
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of the notional real wage can be approximated in exponential  form for 
a representative firm as 
(A4)  Wn  =  exp(h  -  au,)G,, 
where u, is the economywide  unemployment  rate. 
From the definition  of S,,  the average nominal wage  is the sum of 
the  notional  wage  and  the  difference  between  the  nominal  and the 
notional wage  due to wage  ridigity,  such that 
(A5)  -w, =  w  I' +  Gtp  teSt, 
and since  w, is equal to peo)n  (given  that the nominal notional wage  at 
t will  be set with expectations  about the price level  at t), 
(A6)  -w,  =  pBe(n  +  S,G,) 
or, 
(A7)  wt  (1  +  (  lIG))t 
Because p,  =  [1/(p  -  1)]w,IG, by equation A3,  the notional real wage 
divided by productivity can be approximated by (3  -  1)/3.  As a result, 
(A8)  "2,-IPj1  +  (  -1)113)' 
Using  (A3)  for the relation between p, and  -wt,  yields 
(A9)  p,(W  (1  +  w)tG).  Pt 
Pt-P1)13] 
Taking the natural log of both sides of the equation and using equation 
A4 as the approximation for w;' yields 
(A0)  Inp,t  In  +  Inpe  +  St +  h-au,. 
Subtracting the natural log of pt_,  from both sides of (A 10), and noting 
that inflation, mr,,  is approximately equal to ln p,  -  ln p,  and expected 
inflation,  re, is  approximately  equal  to  ln pe  -  ln p,t,  yields  the George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  55 
standard expectations  augmented Phillips curve,  modified by the pres- 
ence of downward rigidity,  S,: 
(Al1)  'T, 
=  1rT  +  c-au,  +  S, 
where c  =  h +  In (f/(f  -  1)). For our nonlinear estimation,  it remains 
to derive the recursion relation of St. 
The Recursion Relation 
The current nominal wage depends on the nominal wage in the past 
as well as on the current notional wage.  Since the current notional wage 
is a parametric function  of the current unemployment  rate (according 
to equation A4),  we can express S, as a function of its past value  and 
the unemployment  rate. We begin with the definition of S,: 
-  W) 
(A 12)  St=  (  G 
It  is  now  necessary  to  express -wt, as  a  function  of -wt,  and  -t2. 
Because  w, is equal to max(w,_  wl), 
(A13)  -w  -w  =  E(w,_1  -  w;Z|(w,_  -  w;Z)  ?  ) 
Pr((,_  l-  w,')  '  0). 
We now derive the preceding result. The main argument resumes after 
equation A18. 
(A14)  -w2,  =  E(w,|w,  >  w,)Pr(wt'  >  w,_') 
+  E(w,_jw,  '  ?  w;)Pr(w,1  '  w,). 
Equation A14  can be written as 
-w,  =  fft  w,ZB(w,ZB  w,wt)dw'1dw,_ 
(A15) 
+ ffVwt-w B(w,,  W,  W)dw,  d  dw7, 
where B is the bivariate density of ws,  and w,  .  Equation A15,  in turn, 
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w,=  J  wJw  B(w;,  w,)dw;dw, 
_x  I't-t  I 
(A 16)  +  ff 
wtB(w", 
w,  )dw,  dw; 
+  t  j  (w,  - w;)B(w;,  w,)dw,dw;, 
or, 
-w,=  Ew,  |  ,'  w_ l)P(w,'  >  w,l) 
(A17)  +  E(ww, 
wt,?-  w,)Pr(wt_, 
?  r  w2) 
+  E(w,  -  w,lw,_  w,)Pr(w,  l  w"). 
As a result, 
(Al8)  -  w  =  E(w,  -  w; (w,t  -  w7)  0) 
Pr((w,_t-  w,)  ? 0). 
We assume that w; and w__ have a joint normal distribution, so their 
difference  has a normal distribution and (Al 3) can be written as 
(A19)  -w, -  w'=  7,(i  w)  +  '  i;)(w  -w 
where 4 is the standard normal density  function,  (I  is the cumulative 
distribution,  and c,  is the standard deviation of w,  -  wl. Making the 
further assumption,  as  an approximation,  that the  variances  and co- 
variances of the joint distribution of wt__ and w', are all proportional to 
the square of p,G,, 
(A20)  t = 
This  normalization  of  c,  makes sense,  as wages  must grow with pro- 
ductivity  and this period's  wage  is determined by expected  prices for 
this period.  As a result,  we find that 
(A21)  St  =  ('Jo  ="40 
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where 
vt-I  -  t 
(A22)  Vt =  G 
Recursion  occurs because  v, can be expressed  as a function  of St_- 
and other variables. This function is obtained by first decomposing -wt 
--wit,  the numerator of  v,, into two  terms: [-w  --w_]  -  [-w 
].  The first term is the numerator of S,  , while  the second  term, 
the change in the notional wage,  can be expressed  as a function of the 
determinants of that change.  Accordingly,  the next step is to note the 
decomposition 
w  -  W;,  pe,  G_ 
(A23)  ~vt  =  e  G,  pe Gt 
_  -W  -  I7l_  l  W-_Gl  pe  G 
w)2  pe_  G,pte  Gt 
We now make four substitutions or approximations: 
-By  definition,  S,_ I  =  [W,t1 -  w-  t-  jGt_ 1. 
_pe_  G,t IlpeG, is approximately  (1  +  g,  +  ,ree)  -1,  where g, is the 
growth of productivity  and  ,  ee  is the growth of price expectations. 
-The  term [(-W i-w  1)Ii2_  ] is the rate of change of  ),  which 
is approximated as g,  +  Tree  -  (au,  -  au,  t),  using equation A4. 
-Since  p,  =  [  1(  -  1)][w,IG,] by equation A3,  we  approximate 
[-2_1Ip,_G,1]  as  (3-  1)/. 
(A24)  ~  S,_,  -  [(13 -  1)I(3]Lrree  +  g,-  a(u,-  ut-,)] 
(A24)  vt  ~  ~  +  ~et  +  g, 
where 
(A25)  Tee  _lnpe  -  lnpe_1  -  e  +  Trt  1  -  'e 
And by assumption,  inflationary expectations  are formed by 
(A26)  trre  =  rIr,1 +  (1  -  t -2- 
To this point,  the model  does  not incorporate the feature of our simu- 
lation  that relaxes  the  constraint  against  wage  cuts  for  firms under 
extreme  duress.  To  do  so,  we  allow  St to decline  when  the share of 
profits (r) falls,  by adding d(r,  -  r,  1) to equation A24 to yield 58  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
St  -  [(f3  -  1)I3]['  tee  +  gt  -  a(u,  -  u-,)] 
(A27)  1 +  Tee  +  g 
+  d(r,- rt-.). 
Equations A1l,  A2 1, A27,  A25,  and A26  describe the model that we 
estimate. 
Estimation 
We estimate  this model  on annual data for the United  States from 
1954 to  1995.  The  profit rate is  constructed  as the ratio of  domestic 
profits and IVA to GDP from the National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPA).  The  1947 to 1984 trend is removed from the series,  since it is 
thought that it mainly  reflects  an increased reliance  on debt financing 
by U.S.  firms, rather than the declining  health of individual firms. The 
equation that we estimate is equation Al 1, with an error term added to 
reflect  errors of  approximation  and omitted  factors.  We  assume  that 
expected  inflation is a moving average of the previous two years' infla- 
tion.  We also assume that the error in equation Al 1  is i.i.d.  with mean 
zero,  except  in the years  of  the Nixon  price controls  and the supply 
shocks of  1973 and 1979.  We include dummy variables for those years 
to  allow  the error to have  a nonzero  mean.  The Nixon  price control 
dummies  are NIXON,  which  is  equal  to  0.25  in  1971  (because  the 
controls were introduced in the fall),  1 in 1972 (when the controls were 
fully  operational),  and 0.5  in  1973  (because  in that year the controls 
were being  eroded and exceptions  were regularly allowed),  and NIX- 
OFF,  which is equal to 1 in 1974,  the year in which the price controls 
were fully  removed. 
We compute inflation as the log change in the GDP deflator, and use 
the  total  civilian  unemployment  rate.  Taking  the  average  annual 
change,  we measured trend productivity as 2.96  percent per year from 
1954 to  1973,  and 0.90  percent per year between  1973 and 1995.  We 
smooth the transition between these two periods by allowing  it to occur 
in equal steps over the five years centered in 1973. 
The model is estimated by nonlinear least squares, which allows  for 
the simultaneous  estimation of the parameters of the Phillips curve and 
S. Thus the time series of S, is itself generated by the estimation process. 
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evaluation  of  the  objective  function.  S,  is  assumed  equal  to  zero  in 
1947,  and is computed  using  equations  A21  and A27  for subsequent 
years.  The  parameters estimated  are a  and c  from equation  Al1,  u0 
from equation A2 1, d from equation A27,  the coefficients  on the dummy 
variables,  and the coefficient  of lagged  inflation ot in equation A26. 
Dynamic  Simulation 
We conduct dynamic  forecasts  of the model for the postwar period 
and the Great Depression.  For the postwar period, S, is set equal to zero 
in  1947 and then constructed using  actual values  of all variables until 
1954. For years after 1954,  the predicted values of inflation are used to 
form inflationary expectations  and to construct S,. 
For the dynamic simulations of the Great Depression,  we use Stanley 
Lebergott's  (1964)  unemployment  series.  GNP and the GNP deflator 
are taken from the NIPA,  and profit rates are calculated from that data 
using  pretax profits.  For years before  1929,  which  are used to obtain 
start-up values,  the GNP deflator constructed by John Kendrick (1961) 
is  used  in log  change  form to measure  inflation,  and profit rates are 
assumed unchanged.  The trend rate of productivity growth was calcu- 
lated as 2.1  percent for the entire prewar period.  S, is constructed by 
using actual values  of its determinants until  1929,  after which the dy- 
namic predictions  of inflation are used to construct inflationary expec- 
tations.  The results of both exercises  are described in the text. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert J. Gordon:  This paper by Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry provides 
a profound challenge  to both classical  and mainstream economists,  who 
track the key macroeconomic  relationships that form the basis of theory 
and  that  influence  policymakers.  For  more  than  two  decades,  both 
groups have  assumed  that the appropriate job  of  policy  is to  "steer" 
real GDP or the unemployment  rate toward the current estimate of the 
"natural rate"  of  real GDP  or unemployment  (the NAIRU).  Policy- 
makers desiring  to maintain a stable inflation rate attempt to maintain 
the actual unemployment rate at the NAIRU,  and those desiring a lower 
inflation rate attempt to maintain the actual unemployment  rate above 
the NAIRU.  With either set of  tastes,  it has been necessary  for poli- 
cymakers to know the NAIRU. 
The NAIRU  approach has created an essential  unity in macroeco- 
nomics.  Nominal  demand disturbances  (caused  by  monetary or non- 
monetary shocks)  are "neutral,"  affecting both output and inflation in 
the  short (and medium)  run, but only  inflation  in the long  run.  Any 
"mistake"  by policymakers would be self-correcting,  since overexpan- 
sion would lead to inflation that would erode real balances and redirect 
the economy  toward the NAIRU,  and vice  versa. 
By arguing that nominal wage rigidity eliminates  monetary neutral- 
ity,  Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry challenge  a  core  element  of  both 
classical  and mainstream macroeconomics.  No  longer  is  a change  in 
nominal  GDP  growth  neutral with  respect  to  unemployment;  as  the 
inflation rate approaches zero,  a deceleration  in nominal GDP growth 
creates a permanent increase in unemployment,  rather than the tempo- 
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rary increase that is usually fed into conventional  measures of the "sac- 
rifice ratio."  For these authors, the sacrifice ratio no longer involves  a 
trade-off  between  the permanent benefits of a lower  inflation rate and 
the temporary cost  of  lower  output.  Instead,  the cost  of lower  output 
and higher  unemployment  is permanent  and swamps  the  permanent 
benefits  of  a zero inflation rate. If their argument is correct,  the Fed, 
and indeed every  foreign central bank, should abandon any attempt to 
achieve  a zero  inflation  rate because  the unemployment  costs  are so 
high. 
Monetary neutrality is a neat and attractive proposition.  It anchors 
much of current thinking  about macroeconomic  policy.  The raw data 
in recent U.S.  history seem entirely consistent  with the existence  of a 
NAIRU  and with a linear short-run Phillips curve-the  deceleration of 
inflation in  1982-87  and 1990-93  and the acceleration  of inflation in 
1987-90  exhibited a magnitude and a timing that are well explained by 
a linear Phillips curve model specified and estimated in the early 1980s, 
before these episodes  occurred. ' 
What, then, do the authors provide to convince  the reader that mac- 
roeconomics  should  abandon the proposition  of  monetary neutrality? 
The paper can be divided  roughly  into thirds, the first part consisting 
of microeconomic  evidence  on the existence  of downward wage rigid- 
ity,  the middle  part consisting  of  a simulation  model  that establishes 
the link between downward wage rigidity and monetary nonneutrality, 
and the final part presenting new time-series  evidence  on the relation- 
ship between inflation and unemployment. 
The first part of the paper reviews  a wealth of interview  and survey 
evidence,  and also presents a new  set of  survey results for the Wash- 
ington  area, demonstrating the reality of  downward wage  ridigity.  A 
basic reason for downward rigidity is the perceived unfairness of wage 
cuts,  except  in the special  circumstances  of the imminent bankruptcy 
of  the firm that is  paying  the  wage.  The  paper takes  from  previous 
research the result that wages  are heterogeneous  across  firms and in- 
dustries to an extent far beyond that which can be explained by differ- 
ences  in labor quality.  Workers with high unexplained  wage differen- 
tials  earn rents,  and the firms paying  these  high  wages  tend to  earn 
above-average  profits. Only when firms are in distress and profits dis- 
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appear, the authors argue, will employees  be willing to accept a nominal 
wage reduction. 
This  part of  the paper provides  convincing  evidence  that nominal 
wage  reductions  are rare.  However,  I question  the relevance  of  this 
evidence  for  the  paper's  broader  macroeconomic  conclusions.  Of 
course  nominal wage reductions are rare in a macroeconomic  environ- 
ment  in  which  inflation  is  positive  and nominal  wages,  on  average, 
grow  at or above  the rate of  inflation.  During the past three decades, 
increases in nominal compensation  per hour of  109 percent (1965-75), 
110 percent (1975-85),  and 48 percent (1985-95)  have been observed. 
In such an environment,  any worker receiving a nominal wage reduction 
would  have a right to feel  aggrieved  that he or she was being  treated 
unfairly. Firms would naturally shy away from imposing nominal wage 
reductions,  except  in very special  circumstances,  because  they would 
risk losing  their best  workers to firms that were paying  out wage  in- 
creases  at something  closer to the national average rate. 
The authors' attempt to reason from evidence  on nominal wage rigid- 
ity in an environment  of rapid positive  average nominal wage  change 
to  a hypothetical  situation  of  zero  average  nominal  wage  change  is 
subject to the Lucas critique.  If the macroeconomic  environment were 
different,  microeconomic  behavior would be different.  Nominal  wage 
reductions  would  no longer be seen as unusual if the average nominal 
wage  was  not  growing.  Workers would  not  see  them as unfair,  and 
firms would not shy away from imposing them, knowing that the alter- 
native wage  for workers who were tempted to quit was not growing. 
Indeed,  standard data show that nominal wages were not rigid in the 
Great Contraction of  1929-33,  but rather, declined by 17 percent. The 
problem  in the Great Depression  was  not that the nominal  wage  was 
rigid downward,  but that it was so flexible  upward! The nominal wage 
jumped by  20  percent  in  1934  and increased  by a further 27  percent 
between  1934 and 1940.2 
The middle part of the paper develops  a simulation model that dem- 
onstrates  the  link  between  nominal  wage  rigidity  and  the  long-run 
inflation-unemployment  trade-off. The intuition behind this link is easy 
to see,  given  a distribution across firms in the equilibrium rate of real 
2.  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  (1973,  series  B69  [CPI]  and series  B70  [real 
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wage  increase  or decrease.  Imagine  that the  growth  rate of  nominal 
demand is reduced to equal that of potential  output,  in an attempt by 
the central bank to push the inflation rate toward zero.  As the inflation 
rate falls  toward zero,  firms on  the  left  side  of  the  distribution,  for 
which the equlibrium real wage change is negative,  find that they cannot 
implement a real wage reduction, since the inflation rate is approaching 
zero  and the  assumed  nominal  wage  floor prevents  a nominal  wage 
reduction. Faced with paying a real wage above equilibrium, these firms 
reduce employment,  and the aggregate unemployment  rate increases. 
The authors provide numerous variations in the simulations and dis- 
cuss the sensitivity  of their results to alternative choices  of parameters. 
But the key to the model is the assumption that the nominal wage floor 
holds  permanently,  in the  sense  that the nominal  wage  is  allowed  to 
decrease by no more than 1 percent per year, no matter what the mac- 
roeconomic  conditions.  The nominal wage paid is a fraction (0.99)  of 
the previous nominal wage or the nominal notional (that is, equilibrium) 
wage,  whichever  is greater. 
The simulation model generates the near-horizontal long-run Phillips 
curve of figure 3 at zero rates of inflation because of the nominal wage 
floor. Without the wage floor, the model generates the standard vertical 
Phillips  curve.  The  value  of  the  exercise  depends  entirely  on  one's 
willingness  to  accept the microeconomic  evidence  in the first part of 
the  paper,  which  was  accumulated  in  an environment  in  which  the 
nominal wage  was increasing by 50 or 100 percent per decade. 
The  reader is  left  with  two  choices.  One  is  to give  up,  to  simply 
abandon further investigation  of this topic,  because  it requires specu- 
lation about microeconomic  behavior in an environment of zero average 
equilibrium nominal wage increase; that is, an environment that has not 
existed at any time during the postwar era. The other is to look to earlier 
history for evidence  of what happens to the economy  when the average 
nominal wage does not increase at all. 
In looking for earlier examples of macroeconomic  behavior in a zero 
inflation environment,  one needs to go back only to 1922-29,  when the 
GDP  deflator was  essentially  constant  and unemployment-far  from 
rising to historic  highs  as implied  by the simulation  plotted  in figure 
3-averaged  just  3.7  percent.  An even  better test of the model's  pre- 
dictions is provided by the recessionary decade of the 1890s.  The nom- 
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recession  was  temporary,  not permanent,  and was  far milder than is 
usually  believed.  The  cumulative  GDP  gap during the period  1891- 
1900  was just  2.8  percent,  comparable  with  U.S.  experience  in  the 
1970s and 1980s.3 
The final part of the paper provides new time-series  evidence  on the 
inflation-unemployment  relation.  It is  essential  to the conclusions  of 
this paper that the Phillips  curve  is nonlinear,  and that the curve be- 
comes  flatter at higher rates of unemployment.  I have studied the non- 
linearity  of  the Phillips  curve recently,  because  my colleague  Robert 
Eisner has been proposing exactly  the opposite  nonlinearity.  He advo- 
cates macroeconomic  policies  that would push the unemployment  rate 
well  below  conventional  estimates  of  the NAIRU,  and to support his 
policy  position  he has come  up with results that show that the Phillips 
curve is much less  steep at low unemployment  rates than at high rates. 
Which is right, Eisner's concave Phillips curve or Akerlof,  Dickens, 
and Perry's convex  Phillips curve? In my view,  neither is correct. The 
Phillips  curve  is  resolutely  linear.  I  have  tested  this  by  taking  my 
standard Phillips  curve,  which  uses  the unemployment  gap as its de- 
mand variable and is estimated over the period 1954-96,  and inserting 
as  an  additional  variable  the  positive  unemployment  gap  (that is,  a 
variable that is zero when the gap is negative  and equals the gap when 
it is positive).  The sum of coefficients  (current and with four lags)  on 
the positive  unemployment  gap variable is highly  insignificant.  As an 
additional  experiment,  I have  defined  a positive  unemployment  gap, 
low  inflation  variable  that equals  the  positive  unemployment  gap  in 
quarters in which  the four-quarter change  in the GDP deflator is  3.0 
percent or below,  and is otherwise zero. It is equally insignificant.  Thus 
I conclude  that the postwar period provides no evidence  whatsoever of 
a nonlinear Phillips  curve,  either convex  or concave. 
Indeed,  in their econometric  results the authors do not provide any 
direct evidence  that the Phillips  curve is nonlinear.  Instead,  in table 5 
they take a simplified  inflation equation and add their wage constraint 
variable, S, which contributes a small improvement in fit for the postwar 
period.  In my view,  the contribution of  S to the postwar equation  is 
simply to proxy for variables that are included in the construction of S 
but are otherwise  omitted  from the equation,  namely,  the change  in 
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unemployment  and the change in productivity.  In my standard inflation 
equation,  the statistical  significance  of the change in unemployment  is 
as great as the level  of  the unemployment  gap,  and the deviation  of 
productivity  growth from trend makes a marginal contribution. 
More interesting is the strong performance of S in explaining inflation 
in  the  Great Depression  (table  5,  column  5-3).  As  is  by  now  well 
known, the standard Phillips curve does not work for the 1930s because 
the large decade-long  positive  unemployment  gap predicts an acceler- 
ating deflation after 1933,  in place of the price increases  that actually 
occurred  (see  figure 7,  lower  panel).  The  large positive  values  of  S 
observed  after 1932 provide  an add-on element  to the predicted value 
of  inflation  that vastly  improves  the performance of  the equation,  as 
contrasted with the standard Phillips curve.  In my own work, in which 
both the level  and change of the unemployment  gap enter, the data of 
the  1930s  cause  the  level  effect  to  vanish,  while  the  change  effect 
remains strong. 
The  ability  of  the  authors'  inflation  equation  to  provide  a unified 
explanation of the 1930s and the postwar period is intriguing.  Yet this 
provides  no evidence  of  the overall  proposition  of  monetary nonneu- 
trality that they  emphasize  as  their main  conclusion.  Instead,  the  S 
variable that provides  the crucial add-on term in the  1930s  combines 
the effects  of numerous subvariables that are built into S, including the 
change in unemployment,  productivity,  and expected  inflation.  As an 
empirical  proposition,  it  would  be  valuable  to  learn which  of  these 
components  of  S  provide  the  needed  explanation  of  inflation  in  the 
1930s,  and how this explanation  compares in predictive  ability to the 
standard unemployment  change variable that others have used. 
The  1930s  do  not  provide  any  convincing  evidence  that nominal 
wage  rigidity  leads  to permanent monetary nonneutrality,  simply  be- 
cause  wage  rigidity  was not the problem in the 1930s.  By some  mea- 
sures, the increase in the real wage in the 1930s was faster than during 
any other decade  in this century. Why nominal wages  were so flexible 
upward is a puzzling  question,  but not one that the authors address. 
To use history to judge the paper's overall conclusion,  I have pointed 
to the  1920s,  when  inflation  was  zero  and unemployment  was  lower 
than the postwar  average,  and to the  1890s,  when  the nominal  wage 
was constant and the recession that occurred was well within the bounds 
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and duration.  Finally,  one  can take the entire post-Civil  War era of 
deflation,  1865-96,  as  evidence  that prosperity  and rapid economic 
growth  are compatible  with falling  prices,  not  to  mention  constant 
prices.  History provides useful lessons,  but these authors have gone to 
the wrong decade to look for them. 
N.  Gregory  Mankiw:  The  Federal  Reserve  now  faces  a  happy  di- 
lemma:  should  it decide  to live  with  inflation of  about 3 percent per 
year,  or should  it try to get  inflation down  even  further and actually 
reach the often  stated but rarely achieved  goal of price stability? This 
paper tries to shed light on this decision  by reviving  and making more 
concrete an old argument of Tobin. I According to that argument, infla- 
tion greases  the wheels  of the labor market by allowing  real wages  to 
fall even when nominal wages  are sticky downward. If the Fed were to 
achieve  true price  stability,  more workers  would  end up with  wages 
above  equilibrium  levels,  and this,  in turn, would  result in a higher 
level  of unemployment. 
My comments  start with the analysis  in the paper. I then turn to the 
broader question for policy:  if a hypothetical Federal Reserve governor 
happened to read this paper, should it persuade her to prefer moderate 
over zero inflation? 
In some  ways,  this  paper is  long  overdue.  It was  more than two 
decades  ago  that Tobin  proposed  that inflation greases  the wheels  of 
the labor market. But until this paper there has, to my knowledge,  been 
no formal modeling  of Tobin's  idea and no attempt to gauge how large 
the benefits of inflation are likely to be. This paper takes three steps in 
the right direction.  First, it presents evidence that nominal wages rarely 
fall  and argues  that previous  evidence  to  the  contrary is  largely  the 
result of measurement error. Second,  it presents a model that formalizes 
the macroeconomic  effects  of  downward wage rigidity.  Third, it pre- 
sents some econometric  results aimed to convince  us that these effects 
have practical importance for understanding the dynamics  of inflation 
and unemployment. 
The first part of the paper is the most persuasive.  I am largely con- 
vinced that cuts in nominal wages  are rare and that measurement prob- 
lems  pervade  the  PSID  data.  I do  have  some  reservations  about the 
1.  See Tobin (1972). George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  67 
authors' telephone  survey,  however,  largely because  people  are often 
reticent to admit bad things about themselves.  The survey results show 
that few people  (2.7  percent) admit to having had a nominal wage cut, 
but many more (14.7  percent)  say they know  someone  else  who  has 
had one.  My impression is that students rarely admit to having cheated 
on exams when asked in surveys,  but they will admit to knowing some- 
one else who has cheated. Dissembling  and self-deception  are powerful 
human traits, especially  when they serve to raise status and self-esteem. 
There  are good  reasons,  based  in evolutionary  psychology,  for  why 
people  have this characteristic,  and there is substantial evidence  for it 
as well.  How much it contaminates  this wage  survey is hard to say. 
The theoretical model is fairly straightforward and does the job that 
it is  intended  to do  (although  with  less  parsimony  than I would  pre- 
fer).  One particular feature deserves  mention: the production function 
Q  =  L.  This  linear production technology  seems  an unobjectionable 
simplification,  but it has strong implications.  Because  this production 
function has constant returns to labor, the model generates the predic- 
tion  of  a noncyclical  real wage.  If this production function  were  re- 
placed  by a more conventional  production function  with diminishing 
returns,  the  model  would  generate  a countercyclical  real  wage-an 
implication  without  any empirical  support.  I stress  this  fact  because 
wages  play  such a central role in the theory presented here.  If one  is 
skeptical of the assumption of constant returns to labor and is convinced 
that the real wage  is  not countercyclical,  then one  should  be uneasy 
about the paper's theory of the labor market. 
The theoretical model assumes that wages  play an important role in 
allocating  labor, even in the short run. Put simply,  whatever the wage, 
the firm always  chooses  a point  on  its  labor-demand curve.  This  as- 
sumpton is controversial.  As many economists  have noted in the past, 
many workers hold  lifetime  jobs.  In the context  of  a long-term  rela- 
tionship  between  employer  and employee,  the wage  is  more like  an 
installment  payment  than an allocative  relative  price.  Thus,  even  if 
wages  are sticky  downward,  that fact may have no effect  on the allo- 
cation  of  resources.  Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry assume  away  this 
possibility. 
It is  with  the third part of  the paper,  which  presents  macroecono- 
metric evidence,  that I have the greatest reservations.  The paper offers 
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imate the inflation behavior in the theoretical model.  When reading this 
part of the paper, I was reminded of Frank Fisher's  Iron Law of Non- 
linear Econometrics:  don't  do  it.  The  results  from this  complicated, 
nonlinear model  are disappointing.  When data for the postwar period 
are used,  the in-sample  fit increases  only  trivially  from the standard, 
linear model:  the R2 rises from 0.82  to 0.84.  When the data from the 
Great Depression  are added, however,  the improvement in fit using this 
model is much greater. 
I am surprised that the authors choose  to ignore two lessons  that we 
have  learned in recent decades  about estimating  Phillips  curve equa- 
tions.  First,  we  know  from  the  work  of  Robert  Lucas  and Thomas 
Sargent that the coefficients  on lagged  inflation need not sum to one, 
even if the natural rate hypothesis is correct.2 If expectations are rational 
rather than adaptive,  the  sum of  the coefficients  will  depend  on  the 
stochastic  process driving inflation.  Summing to unity is a special case 
that holds  only  if  inflation has a unit root.  This  special  case  may be 
approximately  true for the postwar period,  but it is  unlikely  to  hold 
over the period including  the Great Depression. 
Second,  we  know  from previous  work on price equations  that the 
change,  as well  as the level,  of unemployment affects inflation.  Chris- 
tina Romer has recently shown that this rate-of-change  effect  is partic- 
ularly important in understanding inflation in the interwar period.3 Yet 
Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry include only the level of unemployment- 
both  in  the  preferred  nonlinear  model  and  in  the  linear  benchmark 
equation.  They note in passing that adding the rate of change does not 
improve  the fit of  their equations,  but this fact is puzzling  in light of 
previous  work. 
I  should  note  that recent  experience  seems  inconsistent  with  the 
model  developed  here.  If this model were correct, then a reduction in 
inflation, as we have seen recently,  should tend to raise average wages, 
depress profits,  and push upward the steady-state unemployment  rate. 
Instead, the recent reduction in inflation has been associated with stag- 
nant wages,  a profit boom,  and unemployment  lower than many econ- 
omists  thought possible  without  reigniting  inflation.  The results  pre- 
sented  in the paper give  a hint of  the inconsistency  of  the proposed 
2.  Lucas (1972);  Sargent (1971). 
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model  with recent experience.  The authors' simulations  show that the 
nonlinear model  overpredicts  inflation in  1994 and 1995,  the last two 
years of the sample. 
Let me now turn briefly to the broader policy question that motivates 
this paper: should  downward rigidity  of  nominal  wages  deter policy- 
makers from pursuing a policy  of  price  stability? The answer,  in my 
view,  is no. 
My first reason for this judgment is one that I hope the authors would 
share: Tobin's  idea that inflation greases the wheels of the labor market 
is still more an intriguing conjecture than a well-confirmed  theory. This 
paper moves us in the direction of being able to evaluate the conjecture 
empirically,  but  there  is  still  much  to  be  done  before  an  impartial 
observer will be convinced  that downward wage ridigity has important 
macroeconomic  effects. 
In addition, even if there is downward wage ridigity in our economy, 
it might well  decrease  in a regime  of price stability.  To some extent, 
downward  wage  rigidity  is  based  on  workers'  sense  of  what  is  fair 
treatment by their employers.  Yet notions of fairness surely depend on 
the environment.  In a world of price stability,  falling  nominal  wages 
would  be more common,  and aversion  to them would  be reduced,  at 
least to some extent. 
It is easy  to build a theoretical  model in which asymmetric rigidity 
is a by-product of positive  inflation. Imagine a world in which there are 
fixed costs of adjusting wages and inflation is positive.  In this environ- 
ment,  inflation  causes  real wages  to  fall  automatically  over  time.  A 
firm that wants to lower the real wage that it pays does not need to pay 
the adjustment cost;  it can just wait and let inflation do the work.  By 
contrast,  a firm that wants to raise its real wage  has no choice  but to 
pay the adjustment cost;  as a result,  it tends to adjust quickly.  In this 
model,  wages  would  look  downwardly  rigid,  but that behavior  is the 
result of positive  inflation. Under price stability, the asymmetry in wage 
adjustment would disappear.4 
To know whether downward rigidity would actually disappear under 
price stability,  we would need to study some economies  in which prices 
have been more stable than they have been in the United States.  Ger- 
many and Japan over  the postwar  period  are examples  that come  to 
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mind. My impression is that these countries have not suffered substan- 
tially  from their low  rates of  inflation.  The only  macroeconomic  evi- 
dence that Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry offer us for their view  is from 
the Great Depression  in the United  States.  We  should,  however,  be 
reticent to extrapolate results from a massive,  unexpected  deflation in 
order to draw conclusions  about an on-going  regime of price stability. 
To reach a final judgment about a policy  of price stability,  we would 
need  to  conduct  a study  that is  truer to the title  of  this paper,  "The 
Macroeconomics  of  Low  Inflation."  The paper offers  a tentative  as- 
sessment  about one  of  the  many possible  effects  of  low  inflation.  It 
concludes  by acknowledging  that there are benefits to low inflation, and 
then casually dismisses  these benefits as negligible.  Yet that conclusion 
is open to debate. Certainly, the general public has a far greater distaste 
for inflation than the economics  profession  does.5 Perhaps we are just 
better informed than they are; but perhaps it is the other way around. 
In a recent  paper,  Martin Feldstein  tries  to  quantify  some  of  the 
benefits of low inflation.6 One large benefit, he argues, arises from the 
interaction  of  inflation  and taxes.  Many  economists  (though  not all) 
believe  that current policy  taxes  capital  income  more heavily  than is 
desirable.  Moreover,  because the tax laws are not indexed,  that distor- 
tion rises with the inflation rate. In the second-best  world in which we 
live,  the Fed can indirectly  reduce the distortion from capital-income 
taxation by reducing the rate of inflation. 
One might  argue that there are better ways  of  fixing this problem. 
Rather than pursuing a policy  of price stability,  why not just convince 
the Congress  to index the tax code or, better yet,  switch from income 
to consumption  taxation? Here reality quickly steps in. Convincing  the 
Congress  to write a tax code  that is immune to the effects  of inflation 
is probably no easier than convincing  workers and firms to avoid money 
illusion  when they bargain over nominal wages.  It is worth a shot, but 
I would not hold my breath. 
General  discussion:  A number of participants  at  the Panel  meeting 
discussed  the variable margins and consequent variations in real wages 
that were part  of the model  in the meeting  version  of the paper,  and 
5.  See  Shiller  (1996). 
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speculated  about how that feature  of the model might contribute to the 
results.  To clarify  this issue,  the authors,  in the published  version  of 
the paper,  revised  the model to incorporate  constant margins,  noting 
in the text the similarity of the results to those in the meeting version. 
Consequently,  this part  of the meeting  discussion  is  not summarized 
here. 
Robert Hall observed that James Tobin's  case for moderate inflation 
as a grease that helps to accomplish  real adjustments is not confined to 
the labor market and is  consequently  stronger than it appears in this 
paper. Takatoshi Ito added that the zero floor on nominal interest rates 
is more important than downward wage rigidity in explaining  the Great 
Depression  and, in general,  believed  that the interaction between inter- 
est rates and inflation rather than nominal wages and inflation is central 
to understanding economic  fluctuations.  Hall  also  suggested  that the 
paper's focus  on downward nominal wage rigidity understates the full 
extent of rigidities  in employment  relationships,  where it is often dif- 
ficult to rewrite any terms of employment  contracts. His reading of the 
research by Bewley  that the authors cite indicates that the rigid nature 
of many employment  relationships  makes it likely  that the relationship 
will  be broken entirely,  rather than renegotiated,  when modifications 
are needed.  Hall added that in motivating  nominal  wage  rigidity,  the 
paper does  not  adequately  model  the bilateral nature of  employment 
arrangements. 
Turning  to  the  empirical  evidence,  Hall  observed  that the  paper 
receives  no  support  from  cross-country  patterns.  There  are  both 
low-inflation,  low-unemployment  countries,  such as Japan, and low- 
inflation, high-unemployment  countries, such as Germany, and the gen- 
eral cross-country  pattern shows  no  relation  between  unemployment 
and either short-term or long-term inflation.  He conceded  that the fac- 
tors leading to unemployment  are not yet well understood, but thought 
it  telling  that there  is  no  support in  these  data for  the  relationship 
between  unemployment  and inflation  implied  by  the paper.  Edmund 
Phelps added that he knew of a host of cross-country,  time-series  studies 
in  which  countries  are pooled  to  control  for  institutional  and other 
differences,  and that none of these investigations  have found important 
differences across countries as inflation rates get near zero. On the other 
hand, Ito reported that the idea that some  inflation would  help to ac- 
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debates during Japan's high inflation period in the 1950s and 1960s.  At 
the time,  it was  argued that inflation was  useful  to contain real wage 
growth in some of the weaker parts of the economy,  where productivity 
growth  was  slow,  while  real wages  were rising  elsewhere.  He noted 
that the inflation led to substantial real appreciation of the yen  under 
the Bretton Woods  system. 
Charles  Schultze  did not agree that the cross-country  evidence  on 
unemployment  casts doubt over the results of the paper. He noted that 
the key prediction of the paper is that below  some inflation rate, there 
is curvature in the otherwise  vertical,  long-run Phillips curve. There is 
no prediction about what level  of unemployment goes  with the vertical 
portion of  the curve.  He observed  that a host of  factors,  such as the 
structure of  unemployment  benefits  and the  degree  of  unionization, 
differ substantially across countries and are likely to affect the position 
of the vertical portion of the curve,  but that these have nothing to say 
about the validity  of the paper's approach. Perry added that very few 
observations  from advanced economies  at any time in the postwar pe- 
riod provide tests of the model,  since its effects  become important only 
below  low values of the sum of inflation and productivity growth rates. 
While  industrial countries have experienced  stretches of time with in- 
flation  rates  near zero,  these  generally  occurred  in  periods  of  rapid 
productivity growth. 
Most participants accepted the basic facts about downward rigidity 
in  nominal  wages  that motivate  the  model.  However,  David  Lebow 
questioned  some of the evidence  presented in the paper. He noted that 
the model  requires the importance of  downward rigidity  to vary with 
the inflation rate, a condition  that the one-time  survey reported in the 
paper does not address. And he observed that McLaughlin's  work using 
the  PSID  had corrected  for  measurement  error in  that data and had 
drawn different inferences  about the importance of downward rigidity 
than did the present paper. Dickens replied that McLaughlin dealt with 
measurement error by adjusting the standard deviation of wage changes 
in the PSID  and then computing  the proportion of wage  changes  that 
were negative  in the adjusted distribution. However,  if the distribution 
is,  in fact,  asymmetric,  with  very  few  negative  wage  changes,  mea- 
surement error changes  not only  the  standard deviation,  but also  the 
shape of the distribution, introducing additional false negatives.  Simply 
correcting the standard  deviation does not eliminate all the false negatives, George A. Akerlof, William  T. Dickens, and George L. Perry  73 
and so,  substantially overestimates the proportion of wage changes that 
are negative. 
Hall challenged  the authors to explain the 1920s as well as the Great 
Depression  with their model,  since  in the period  1920-22  prices  fell 
without  very  high  levels  of  unemployment.  As  a related  matter, 
Schultze observed that downward rigidity may not have been so impor- 
tant in earlier years.  In particular, he reported that the proportion of 
workers with permanent job attachments, measured by workers in jobs 
with  current or eventual  tenure of  twenty  years  or more,  was  much 
lower in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than it is now. 
If long-term  association  between  a particular employer  and employee 
is enforced  by  some  social  convention  of  fairness  in wage  setting  on 
both sides,  and if one component of fairness is avoiding nominal wage 
cuts,  then it is  perfectly  consistent  with the authors' framework that 
nominal wages  were less  downwardly rigid in these earlier years than 
they are now. 
Dickens,  responding  to Gordon's  formal comments,  noted that the 
simulation model does  allow  for nominal wage  cuts when firms are in 
distress,  and would  predict deflation  in conditions  such as those  that 
prevailed in the early 1930s. He also pointed out that Gordon's evidence 
on the shape of the short-run Phillips curve is irrelevant, since the model 
presented does not dispute the shape of the short-run trade-off,  but the 
location of the long-run trade-off. 
Lebow  noted that downward nominal  wage  rigidity  is evidence  of 
money  illusion  and that if one  accepted  it,  one  should take seriously 
other possible  aspects of money  illusion  as well,  such as its effect  on 
decisions  about saving  and when to retire. He cautioned  that the dis- 
tortionary impact of  inflation on people's  behavior  is potentially  far- 
reaching,  so  it is  unclear whether,  on balance,  money  illusion  is  an 
argument in favor of moderate inflation. 74  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1996 
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